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I. INTRODUCTION

It is always an interesting task to attempt to assist foreign colleagues
from civil law tradition nations in understanding a complex area of U.S.
jurisprudence. The task becomes more than interesting, it indeed becomes
a challenge, when the subject area is one that has gained its contours over the
years in the courts, creating an evolutionary development from origins in
legislative enactment of doubtful meaning in the distant past. The task is
compounded when the subject is procedural law, the development of which
in the common law has often preceded the formulation of substantive rules.
The idea of procedure as possessing substance, or even having independent
value as a worthy academic focus, is not always welcome in civil law
tradition nations. This article is intended to assist in understanding the
judicial development of extraterritorial jurisdiction specifically in the field of

* Chesterfield Smith Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Florida. The
author wishes to thank his research assistant Daniel Visiou for his assistance in researching
the materials for this article. This article was first presented as a lecture at a Max Planck
Institute Symposium in Konstanz, Germany.
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securities fraud litigation, but with some background outlining the extraterritorial application of antitrust law. Increased international trade and
investment have resulted in more conflicts and often in a dissonant clash of
overlapping subject matter jurisdiction rules of different nations.'
The development of extraterritorial subject matter jurisdiction may be
compared to a system of pyramids. Envision a series of twelve securities
fraud law pyramids, one for each federal circuit. The various federal district
court decisions for that circuit on extraterritorial subject matter jurisdiction
in securities fraud cases form the base of each pyramid. Not all circuits have
many district court decisions; the Second Circuit pyramid has the most
district court decisions. The apex of each pyramid, above the often
inconsistent rulings on the lower lines, is the appeals court for that circuit,
which expresses the controlling reasoning of the circuit for a specific field,
in this case securities fraud.
Next to the series of twelve securities fraud law pyramids are similar
groups of twelve pyramids, each representing a different area of extraterritorial application of U.S. law, such as antitrust, civil rights, labor, and environmental regulation. For a few areas of the law, there is a larger pyramid on
top of one group of twelve in the specific area, with its lower base line the
twelve circuit courts. This larger pyramid represents where the U.S. Supreme
Court, the apex, has addressed the issue and resolved what may have been
inconsistent views among two or more of the circuits. The Supreme Court
has rendered decisions on extraterritorial subject matter jurisdiction involving
areas such as antitrust and civil rights (equal employment laws).2 The
securities fraud group has no such higher apogee to its lower pyramids
because the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of extraterritorial
subject matter jurisdiction in securities fraud litigation.
This article may help in understanding how the Supreme Court might
rule in such a case, and how Supreme Court decisions in other areas, such
as antitrust and civil rights law, might affect that decision. The search for
answers extends across the tops of the securities fraud pyramids, in an
attempt to predict which federal circuit court decisions are most apt to find
favor in a future Supreme Court decision, and to look at parallel specific
fields, such as antitrust and civil rights law, where the Supreme Court has
given guidance. The danger of the latter is that these Supreme Court
decisions may be based on a legislative intent to extend one very specific
law's application extraterritorially. The legislative intent of one law, for

1. See generally THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE EXTRATER iTORIAL
APPLICATION OF NATIONAL LAWS (Dieter Lange & Gary Born eds., 1989); A.V. LOWE,
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION (1983).
2. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) [hereinafter Aramco].
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example, the antitrust law, may be quite different from that of another, such
as the securities fraud law. Thus, one must consider a Supreme Court
decision in one field to have constraints. While many of the laws in
question, including the antitrust and securities fraud laws, have no clear
legislative guidance as to their intended reach abroad, each law may have
definable purposes that justify different extensions abroad.
United States Supreme Court decisions sometimes establish very broad
principles. These often are the decisions that receive the most publicity and
the most criticism for "social engineering." But many, if not most, Supreme
Court decisions are carefully crafted to address statutory interpretation of
federal laws. It is these latter decisions that we will consider. In doing so,
it is worth remembering that the apexes (the circuit court decisions) of the
lower pyramids, if influenced by different levels of legislative intent in
different specific fields, do not necessarily form a level base from which to
suggest that a Supreme Court ruling in one field is clearly applicable to
another. There may be no common limits to extraterritorial application of
laws from different fields, although there must be some point of extraterritoriality beyond which no application will apply under international comity
rules. However, we are often disinclined to consider that a Supreme Court
ruling directly applicable to one field of law might be useful in resolving
disputes in another. One purpose of this article is to consider whether U.S.
Supreme Court decisions, such as HaqfordFireInsurance Co. v. California3
(antitrust law), and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian
American Oil Co. (Aramco)4 (civil rights law), speak to the application of
extraterritorial law beyond their principal focus, possibly to the field of
securities fraud law.
One principle that has been vigorously promoted in the United States as
a means of resolving extraterritorial subject matter issues is interest
balancing, which might be better described as comparative interests theory.
Interest balancing is a concept little known abroad and not fully accepted at
home. It places a heavy burden on the courts to accurately identify and
weigh foreign interests, which this observer believes is an inappropriate
burden in the United States and an unacceptable one in most nations abroad.
Although intertwined with the international law concept of comity,
comparative interests theory extends much further. Although its origins are
largely in antitrust law for determining liability or relief rather than
jurisdiction, contemporary advocates of comparative interests theory do not
limit it to any specific field; therefore, we might expect the Supreme Court
to be the forum that would establish or adopt interest balancing as a test to

3. 509 U.S. at 764.
4. 499 U.S. at 244.
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be applied for any extraterritorial application of U.S. law. But the Supreme
Court has avoided embracing interest balancing. The Supreme Court has at
the very least severely limited the usefulness of interest balancing, although
probably not eliminated its potential applicability.
As yet, there are no clear answers, and there may never by any clear
answers. Therefore, this article is not intended to present U.S. law as a
completed, marble work of art, a legal parallel to the sculpture of David, but
is related more to one of Michelangelo's works with unfinished contours,
perhaps a few clear ideas, leaving some rejected pieces lying visibly on the
studio floor. Interest balancing is either one of the discarded pieces on the
floor or one still remaining on the uncompleted marble statue, but being
chipped away by the master builders in the courts. This article will outline
the early creation of the securities statute, as opposed to the marble statue,
and then address the progress to date in carving the clearly still unfinished
product.
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is rarely viewed
within the United States as an overzealous, securities fraud police force.
Certainly some purchasers and sellers of securities, both professional brokers
and individuals who have been charged with securities fraud, have been
displeased with the challenge to their conduct by the SEC. But no more so
than domestic persons accused of violations of other federal statutes, from
Justice Department challenges to price fixing agreements as violations of the
antitrust laws to Treasury Department challenges to transfers of funds abroad
as violations of foreign assets control regulations. The SEC has been
functioning for more than sixty years. It has gained acceptance within the
United States as an institution with an important role in maintaining fair
securities markets and fair trading within those markets.
When alleged securities fraud involves acts not of U.S. citizens in the
United States, but of foreign citizens acting largely abroad, actions of the
SEC may not be well received or fully understood.' This also has been true
of Department of Justice actions under the antitrust laws. Both laws provide
for a mix of civil and criminal actions, which sometimes creates confusion
or sends mixed signals abroad.6 When private actions claiming treble

5. The extraterritorial application of securities fraud provisions may be more extensive
than the reporting and registration requirements indicate. See, e.g., Consolidated Gold Fields
PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1989) (Great Britain) (holding that a transaction
involving a target company in which 2.5% of the shareholders were U.S. citizens has a
substantial effect with the United States so to allow the court to find subject matter
jurisdiction); Plessy Co. PIc v. General Elec. Co. Pic, 628 F. Supp. 477, 477 (D.Del. 1986)
(exempting U.K. company from disclosure filings in contest for control of second U.K.
company).
6. The In re Uranium antitrust litigation is perhaps the best example. See In re Uranium
Antitrust Litig. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979). Foreign courts were
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damages are initiated along with SEC actions, or are undertaken without
separate SEC action, the reaction from abroad is often of even greater
displeasure. What creates the greatest concern abroad is the elusive U.S.
version of extraterritorial subject matter jurisdiction.7
The law of extraterritorial application of laws has developed in the
United States principally in the federal circuit courts of appeal," with only
occasional but important rulings from the Supreme Court. This judicial
development of the law has been influenced, not always helpfully, by the two
successive Restatements of Foreign Relations Law produced by the American
Law Institute (ALI).9 Sections of the Restatements have been important to
the development of the conduct and effects tests, when courts have searched
for a way to express the uncertain congressional intent regarding whether
U.S. laws have extraterritorial reach.' But other sections of the Restatement have proven ineffective and even a hinderance to the resolution of
international disputes." These include the interest balancing or comparative
interests theory provisions, which have their source less in what the courts
or Congress have said than in what the drafters of the Restatement thought
the law should be. Their creation has contributed to considerable confusion
as to what courts ought to do. While the courts have ignored interest
balancing for the most part, its advocates continue to promote it as the best
solution to international conflict.
This author agrees with the advocates of interest balancing that it may be
the ideal solution, but it is unworkable and unpredictable, and in practice has
proven inconsistent in application. Interest balancing had its moment of

concerned with allowing civil litigation discovery in their nations where there were criminal
investigations in progress that might have benefitted from the civil discovery. In re
Westinghouse Uranium Contract, 1978 A.C. 547, 549, 592 (United Kingdom). Discovery was
prohibited or severely restricted by laws in five nations: Australia, Canada, South Africa,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. at 1143.
7. See Harold G. Maier, Interest Balancing and ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,31 AM. J.
COMP. L. 579, 579 (1983); Tina Kahn, Comment, The Protection of TradingInterests Act of
1980: Britain'sResponse to U.S. ExtraterritorialAntitrust Enforcement, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 476, 476 (1980).
8. Some federal district court opinions are helpful, but they often tend to be inconsistent
even within the circuits.
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
SECOND RESTATEMENT]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987) [hereinafter TImRD RESTATEMENT]. The two

(1965) [hereinafter

Restatements have been labelled Second and Third. There were discussions regarding a First
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, but it was never completed.
10. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 402 (stating that "[s]ubject to s 403, a state has
jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to ... conduct outside its territory that has or is
intended to have substantial effect within its territory"). Perhaps more importantly, the
Restatement has influenced the development of these tests, whether or not they accurately
reflect legislative intent.
11. Id. § 403.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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glory in antitrust litigation, but it has not proven its merit in other areas,
including securities litigation. Efforts to promote interest balancing might be
better spent attempting to assist the development of positive rules regarding
what quality and quantity of conduct and what effects in the United States
justify the application of extraterritorial jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that
another forum or law also might be an appropriate, or even a more
appropriate, forum on law. Furthermore, foreign courts seeking to interpret
international law, especially international comity, do not consider the
Restatement to be anything more than what it is, a U.S. view of the world as
interest balancing advocates in the United States would like it to be.12 It
has limited relevance in the resolution of international disputes in foreign or
international forums.
Originally, the intent of this article was to explore the development of
extraterritorial subject matter jurisdiction in securities fraud cases and to
present some thoughts on how the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Hartford
Fire Insurance13 and Aramco 4 might affect the conflict among the federal
circuit courts in securities fraud cases. But on February 8, 1996, the Ninth
Circuit handed down its decision in Butte Mining Plc v. Smith. 5 The Butte
Mining decision in the United States and several related decisions in the
United Kingdom, which created a serious conflict between these two
jurisdictions involving the use of antisuit injunctions,' 6 have changed some
of the questions that need to be discussed.
It is this author's view that the Ninth Circuit decision in Butte Mining
would have been different in the absence of the Hartford Fire Insurance
decision and the U.K. High Court rulings in Simon EngineeringPlc v. Butte
Mining Plc.7 Although the Second Circuit had crafted a relatively
consistent rule of subject matter jurisdiction in international securities fraud
cases,' 8 a view which was departed from partly by the Third and Eight
Circuits, the Ninth Circuit in Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz made a significant
departure by interpreting the securities laws far more broadly to allow subject
matter jurisdiction where the conduct in the United States was at best
marginal. 1" HartfordFire Insurance must have affected the Ninth Circuit's

12. If interest balancing is a world vision, it ought to be the product of a world
organization and not of the A.L.I.
13. HartfordFire Ins., 509 U.S. at 764.
14. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 244.
15. 76 F.3d 287 (9th Cir. 1996).
16. See Simon Eng'g Pic v. Butte Mining Plc, [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 104 (Feb. 27, 1995),
[1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 91 (Oct. 3, 1995) (Eng.).
17. Simon Eng'g, [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 104; [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 91.
18. The Second Circuit includes New York City, which is the location of much important
securities litigation.
19. 712 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1993).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol10/iss3/4
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possible use of interest balancing in Butte Mining.20 Furthermore, the level
of judicial conflict between the United States and the United Kingdom in the
Butte Mining litigation may have caused the Ninth Circuit to adopt a stricter
test for subject matter jurisdiction, more in line with the Second Circuit's
decisions and inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's earlier Grunenthal
decision. The Supreme Court Aramco decision casts some doubt on the
extraterritorial application of any congressional act where there is no clear
intent for such extension abroad.2'
Supreme Court resolution of conflicting views among federal circuit
courts is always welcome, especially when it informs foreigners acting abroad
when their conduct might subject them to liability in the United States by the
application of a U.S. law with an extraterritorial reach.22 It is no less
reasonable for U.S. citizens subjected to developing subject matter jurisdic-

tion theories in foreign nations to expect such theories to have some measure
of predictability, fairness, and consistency. Foreign nations, which have long
objected to the extraterritoriality of U.S. laws, recently have been responding
in several ways. One response has been to adopt defensive measures in the
form of blocking laws, sometimes including clawback provisions, which
create further conflict between the two nations.23 A second response has
been to grant antisuit injunctions when one of their nationals is the plaintiff
and another is a principal defendant in a U.S. action, such as in the Laker
Airways litigation and the Butte Mining litigation. A third response has been
to adopt an extraterritorial approach in the application of their own laws,
illustrated by the European Court of Justice acceptance of an effects test for

20. Interest balancing had been introduced by the Ninth Circuit in the antitrust decision
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), discussed infra.
21. See 499 U.S. at 248 (stating that there is a presumption against extraterritorial
application of U.S. law unless there is a contrary intent).
22. The exposure to far greater damages in the United States, both punitive and treble
damages, is a good reason for foreigners to be careful to avoid subjection to subject matter
and personal jurisdiction in the United States. The dislike of U.S. damages was clearly
expressed by the U.K. High Court in the Simon Engineering decision. [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep.
91.
23. See, e.g., Kahn, supra note 7, at 476. In view of the Hartford Fire Insurance
decision, these laws may proliferate so as to attempt to create a true conflict in the U.S. courts
allowing application of principles of international comity. Some blocking laws include what
are known as "clawback" provisions, which allow a national subjected to a treble damage
judgment in the United States to take back the amount of the damages from any assets the
plaintiff has in the country enacting the blocking, or clawback, legislation. See Note, Power
to Reverse Foreign Judgments: The British Clawback Statute Under International Law, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 1097, 1098 (1981). More recently, the enactment of the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 has increased the pace of the enactment of
foreign blocking laws. 22 U.S.C. § 6001 (1994).
Blocking laws are not favored by advocates of interest balancing. See Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and Reasonableness: A Reply to A. V.Lowe, 75 AM. J.
INT'L L. 629, 637 (1981).
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application of the Treaty of Rome antitrust provisions.2 4 Finally, a fourth
response of foreign nations has been to undertake their own concept of
interest balancing, which may turn into more a disparagement of the another
nation's legal system than a balancing of positive national interests, as in the
Butte Mining litigation in the English courts.
This article will attempt to work through the maze of various concepts
of international securities fraud subject matter jurisdiction, that are found in
the decisions of the U.S. federal circuit courts. If the maze is not understood
by foreign jurists, it may well be rejected, promoting the adoption and use
of responses by foreign nations that are as described above, which was the
experience following the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws to
foreign conduct. The extraterritorial application of law and foreign responses
to it have created a distinct dissonance in international commercial relations.
Attempts have been made to add limits to the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in U.S. courts by the mysterious process of interest balancing.25
But interest balancing has neither functioned well nor been accepted by many
courts.2 6 Attempts to interest balance may lead to the unpleasant result of
raising and discussing one nation's dislike of the another nation's legal
culture.2 v In such a hostile environment, interest balancing is misconceived
and rendered of limited value. Furthermore, statutes increasingly express a
clear extraterritorial intent, as do such foreign responses as blocking laws,
leaving little latitude in the procedure for interest balancing.
Interest balancing, which has a very limited and largely academic
following in its country of origin, the United States, is being challenged and
rejected because it (1) is so complex that it is unfair to expect judges to
properly apply the test, (2) includes a broad range of areas to consider,
reaching beyond reasonable time and expense limitations of the litigation
system, (3) mistakenly suggests that judges of one nation are able to correctly
and fairly measure the public interests of another nation, (4) offers no
guidance as to which factors are more or less important or what weight is to
be given to each, (5) constitutes an inappropriate test for harmonizing legal
norms applied in the courts of various nations because of the different role

24. See Re Wood Pulp Cartel v. ECC, Joined cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 & 125-129/85,
[1988] E.C.R. 5193, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 901. Although the decision stated it was applying the
territorial principle because the producers, including foreign companies, had implemented their
pricing agreement within the market, the principal conduct of making such agreements
occurred outside the European Union, with intended effects occurring within the European

Union.
25. See, e.g., Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614.
26. John B. Sandage, Note, Forum Non Conveniens and the Extraterritorial Application
of United States Antitrust Law, 94 YALE L. J. 1693, 1702 (1985) (citing Laker Airways, 731
F.2d at 951).
27. British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, Ltd., [1985] 1 App. Cas. 58, 78.
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and function of civil law attorneys and judges and fact-gathering procedures
in civil law nations, and (6) has not been especially well received by U.S.
courts during the years (now several decades) since it was introduced. 28 If
the area is ever to be the subject of international harmonization efforts, a less
idealistic but more predictable and functional test is needed. One of the
questions raised by the Hartford Fire Insurance decision and the Butte
Mining litigation is whether interest balancing theory should continue to have
any role, especially in complex litigation involving such fields as antitrust
and securities fraud litigation.
II.

EXTRATERRITORIAL SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION IN
ANTITRUST LITIGATION

Before embarking upon a consideration of the variations on a theme of
extraterritoriality in securities fraud law subject matter jurisdiction, some
comment on the development of the antitrust law effects test and interest
balancing will illustrate the most important precedents to the subsequent
development of extraterritorial application of securities fraud law. This
review is necessary to understand the Hartford Fire Insurance decision,
which dictates the future course of antitrust law and likely influences other
areas where the extraterritorial application of law is involved, including
securities fraud.
A.

Pre-Hartford Fire Insurance Antitrust Decisions

Both the initial antitrust laws and the initial securities fraud laws in the
United States were enacted to address domestic problems. The Sherman
Antitrust Act of 1898 was intended to reduce the anticompetitive conduct of
the various "trusts" of the late nineteenth century, which were harming
competition in the United States.29 The Act was not drafted to reach any
then existing foreign conduct causing anticompetitive effects in the United
States, but it does refer to "trade or commerce ... with foreign nations."3
Although the first major test of the reach of the Act abroad was the

28. Ruggero J. Aldisert, Federal Courts and ExtraterritorialLaw: Enlightened Self
Interest or Yankee Imperialism?, 5 J. L. & COM. 415, 415, 421-22, 427 (1985); Sandage,
supra note 26, at 1701-07.
29. ALBERT H. WALKER, HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 10, 13 (1980).
30. The act states: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). This provision is expanded in the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA), which constitutes the current
status of statutory law and is discussed infra. 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
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American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. decision in 1910, 31 Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes' territorial based limitations of the Act did not long
survive. 32 These limitations were based on a rigid conflict of laws theory
that the law of the place of the act determines both the existence and the
extent of an obligation. 3 Even if conflict of laws principles were the
proper approach to resolve the current lack of clarity over the extraterritorial
application of laws, the rigid conflicts views that prevailed in the first half
of the century were moderated in subsequent decisions and legislative
amendments in the antitrust field. Antitrust developments may be a precursor
to changes in other areas such as securities fraud.
The first important challenge to territorial based limits on extraterritorial
application of domestic law was the 1945 United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America (Alcoa) decision, where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
introduced the "effects" test. 34 This test interpreted the Sherman Antitrust
Act language as applicable to conduct that is wholly or partly foreign, and
where that conduct is intended to and does have an effect in the United
States.35 As becomes evident in subsequent antitrust cases, as well as in
cases involving securities fraud discussed below, "conduct" and "effects" as
the basis for jurisdiction carry the debate into more complex dimensions than
where the limits on jurisdiction stop at the water's edge or the border under
the territorial approach. As long as conduct and effects (or conduct or
effects) remain unburdened by a complex interest balancing test, they retain

31. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). The territorial approach, also reflected in writings of Beale and
the original RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, does not necessarily exclude extraterritoriality, if it simply expresses a preference for the application of the law of the forum to govern
actions occurring in the nation. It is beyond the scope of this Article to debate the territorial
view in the first four decades of this century. Such a discussion would be largely irrelevant
to this Article, which suggests the need for international unification of securities fraud
standards.
32. An interesting discussion of this decision, offering some insight into Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes' notion of territoriality, which he formulated after being injured in the U.S.
War Between the States, is contained in JOHN T. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE
LAW, ch. 3 (1976). John Noonan, 20 years later as Judge Noonan of the Ninth Circuit, would
pull back the Ninth Circuit from its efforts to broaden extraterritorial subject matter
jurisdiction, in the Butte Mining decision discussed infra.
33. Justice Holmes drew on the existing rigid territorial choice of law doctrine, as
expressed in Slaterv. Mexican Nat ' R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 125 (1909), an earlier opinion he had
written.
34. 148 F.2d 416, 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The decision could not be rendered by the
Supreme Court because it could not obtain a quorum. It was referred to the Second Circuit
by the Supreme Court. These events, plus the fact that the decision was written by Learned
Hand and rendered by a court that included Learned and Augustus Hand, have given the
decision status somewhere between a decision of the Circuit Court and the Supreme Court,
probably closer to the latter.
35. Id. at 443.
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36

some predictability.
Thirty-one years passed before the next significant case law development
in the evolution of subject matter jurisdiction in antitrust law. This relative
inaction on the subject by the courts should not suggest a period of dormancy
in thinking and debate on the issue. In the interim, Professor Kingman
Brewster suggested in 1958 that judges should consider, when determining
liability or relief in antitrust cases,37 a list of factors representing the
interests of each affected nation.38 This list would be amended and altered
by successive supporters of Brewster's work.39 More importantly, the use
of the list would extend beyond the suggestion for consideration to determine
liability or relief to whether there should be subject matter jurisdiction, or
whether the court should go forward after determining that there is
jurisdiction.40
One of the first uses of a list to consider different national interests
appeared in 1965 in the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of

36. Furthermore, there is a danger when interest balancing is applied that a court may
overlook the prerequisite to interest balancing, that is, the presence of effects sufficient to
satisfy the Alcoa test. Id. at 416.
37. Such determination is in contrast to determining whether there is subject matter
jurisdiction, or to deciding not to go ahead for reasons of comity after determining that there
is such jurisdiction.
38. KINGMAN BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446 (1958);
JAMES R. ATWOOD & KINGMAN BREWSTER, 1 ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
(2d ed. 1981). Professor Brewster suggested:
(a) the relative significance to the violations charged of conduct within the United
States as compared with conduct abroad;
(b) the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American
consumers or Americans' business opportunity;
(c) the relative seriousness of effects on the United States as compared with those
abroad;
(d) the nationality or allegiance of the parties or in the case of business associations,
their corporate location, and the fairness of applying our law to them;
(e) the degree of conflict with foreign laws and policies; and
(f) the extent to which conflict can be avoided without serious impairment of the
interests of the United States or the foreign country.
BREWSTER, supra, at 446; see also WILBUR L. FUGATE, 1 FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE
ANTITRUST LAWS (2d ed. 1973) (1958).
39. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 9; THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 9;
Lowenfeld, Hague Lectures, infra note 43.
40. Deciding whether to go forward could be based on comity without reaching the issue
of choice of law. Comity would consider the various interests in the lists offered as tests.
A court would not consider what law is applicable, but whether the court has subject matter
jurisdiction and whether it should go forward for reasons of comity. Assuming the court
chooses to go forward under a comity test, under choice of law principles it then could decide
not to apply U.S. antitrust law, but the law of the foreign nation. But does this mean
application of foreign, local antitrust law, which is not present in many nations, or recognition
of foreign blocking statutes as substantive law?
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the United States.4' This list was intended by the Restatement drafters to
limit enforcement jurisdiction.42 Professor Andreas Lowenfeld in his 1979
Hague Lectures soon enlarged the list to ten factors for courts to consider
when exercising legislative jurisdiction. 43 The enlargement of the list and
expansion of its scope of application served the intellectual demands of the
Hague Lectures admirably,44 but it did not present a realistic test that would
be welcomed by U.S. courts or by lawyers seeking the smallest measure of
predictability. Use of such a test would require an extensive judicial
discretion, which might function in a smaller and more homogeneous legal
system such as in England, but it would not assist in the development of a
consistent judicial theory in the larger and less homogeneous system in the
United States. Furthermore, it was unlikely to be welcomed abroad,
especially in civil law based systems, where such discretion would be

41. SECOND

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 9, § 40. It listed five factors to consider:

(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions
would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the
other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which the enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be
expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
Id.
42. Cf THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 403(2)(a-h) (applying its longer list to
jurisdiction to legislate).
43. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the InternationalArena: Conflict of Laws,
InternationalLaw, and Some Suggestionsfor Their Interaction, 163 RECUEIL DES COURS 311,
328-29 (1979) [hereinafter Lowenfeld, Hague Lectures]. Professor Lowenfeld suggested:
(i) the character of the activity to be regulated;
(ii) the basic policies underlying the regulation;
(iii) the link between the State under whose authority the regulation is to be carried
out and the person or persons principally responsible for the activity to be regulated;
(iv) the needs and traditions of the international political, legal, and economic
system;
(v) the protection of justified expectations;
(vi) the conflicts, if any, between the regulation in question and the exercise of
legislative jurisdiction pursuant to the authority of another State;
(vii) the conflicts, if any, between the regulation in question and the potential
exercise of legislative jurisdiction pursuant to the authority of another State;
(viii) the territory in which the activity is principally carried on;
(ix) the direct and foreseeable effect of the activity;
(x) in the case of exercise of delegated authority, the intention of the person or
body that has delegated the authority.
Id. Professor Lowenfeld stated that he sought "reasonableness, not certainty." Id. at 329.
44. Professor Lowenfeld would not necessarily limit consideration to the ten factors,
which he describes as illustrative rather than complete. See Lowenfeld, Hague Lectures, supra
note 43, at 328.
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inconsistent with the function allocated to most civil law judges.45
Professor Lowenfeld's list nevertheless offered a carefully considered
suggestion for an ideal but hypothetical world from which we may develop
a less demanding test for a less ideal but real world.' 6
As Associate Reporter for the 1987 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States, Professor Lowenfeld had considerable
influence in developing a new Restatement list of factors for courts to
consider in limiting what the Restatement refers to as "jurisdiction to
prescribe."47 It is better understood by foreign jurists, especially those with

a civil law tradition as jurisdiction to legislate.4" The provision of the Third
Restatement that is important to this article is its basis for jurisdiction to
prescribe, which includes "conduct outside its territory that has or is intended
to have substantial effect within its territory."4 9 Left without further
clarification, this provision would allow development of a theory with far
greater predictability than the confusion created by the Third Restatement's
section 403, which lists eight limitations on jurisdiction.50 This list includes
three more factors than the Second Restatement to consider, but it contains
two less than Professor Lowenfeld's Hague Lecture list.5
The Third

45. Any theory of such importance in international disputes such as the governance of
conduct that occurs abroad ought to gain the respect and understanding of jurists in other
systems. Perhaps it also should be a theory that would be expected to gain favor in
international attempts of harmonization of the law. Any theory that is inconsistent with the
function of judges in much of the world would not pass such a test.
46. Nearly two decades have proven Professor Lowenfeld's list to be theory versus
practice. This author has not read any significant case that attempted to use this intimidating
test to resolve the issue. It is an aspirational test, not one of "how things really work." But
in aspirations lie far more appropriate solutions than when the "way things ought to work" is
absent from our thinking. For that alone Professor Lowenfeld deserves the appreciation and
admiration of the full international, not just the Hague, "academy."
47. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 403.
48. Professor Lowenfeld had used this more commonly found term, "jurisdiction to
legislate," in his Hague Lectures. Drafters of old ideas sometimes attempt to give them
greater credibility with new labels. The attempt was to clarify that in addition to the
legislature, other branches of government, such as the executive branch, legislate. They
prescribe rules. The definition of legislate is to make laws, without specifying the source.
Jurisdiction to legislate remains the more universally accepted term.
49. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 402(c).
50. Id. § 403(2)(a-h).
51. Compare id. § 403, with SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 40 and Lowenfeld,
Hague Lectures, supra note 43, at 311, 328-29. Section 403 suggests that jurisdiction to
prescribe as defined in § 402 is limited and requires the consideration of all relevant factors,
specifically listing eight:
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state
may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity
having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is
unreasonable.
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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Restatement also considers the section 403 interest balancing test applicable

is determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial,
direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation
is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation
to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities,
and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise
jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are in
conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other state's
interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors, Subsection (2);
a state should defer to the other state if that state's interest is clearly greater.
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 403(1)-(3).
If the use of the term "state" is confusing to foreign readers, "state" means a nation
rather than a state within the United States. The Restatement of Foreign Relations, perhaps
more than any other of the Restatement series, is an exercise in drafting not what the law is
but what the drafters would like it to be. While that also is true to various degrees with
regard to the restatements that address domestic law, such as agency or contracts, it is more
troublesome when dealing with international law. Although the title of the restatement is THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, the language does seem to attempt to craft

international principles, which are better left to international groups than the A.L.I. The
Restatement suggests some opinion within the very prestigious A.L.I. as to what U.S. law
ought to be in numerous cross-border situations. It is a remarkable effort, but should not be
mistaken for positive law. The Restatement has been used as a basis of the adoption of
principles of law by some state legislatures and courts. It has been rejected or completely
ignored by others. One example of rejection involved interpretation of the language of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), in the third part of the commercial activity
exception. The language stating an exception is granted to an "act outside ... the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States," caused a split in the federal circuit courts. 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994). Some followed the view that the effect must be "substantial" and
"foreseeable," drawing specifically on the language in the Restatement's jurisdiction to
prescribe provisions, which had seemingly been approved by the House Report in drafting the
FSIA. But other circuits rejected this view and held that the direct effect requirement was
satisfied where there was some financial loss. The U.S. Supreme Court accepted the latter
view in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992). Lack of attention to
the Restatement's specific provisions regarding securities law is discussed infra.
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to specific problems of antitrust5 2 and securities regulation.53 Section 403
has not been well received by the courts in either area of litigation.'
Midway between the adoption of the Second Restatement in 1965 and the
Third Restatement in 1987," the often adventuresome Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, in 1976, addressed an antitrust case where conduct had occurred
outside the United States but the alleged effect was within the United
States.56 In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, the Ninth Circuit,
departing from the Second Circuit, viewed the direct and substantial effects
test introduced in Alcoa as inadequate because it failed "to consider other
the full nature of the relationship
nations' interests ...[or] take into account
57
between the actors and this country.

52. THiRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 415 (affirming that antitrust matters are "subject
to the jurisdiction to prescribe" rules, which include the section 403 interest balancing provisions). Since the adoption of the Third Restatement, no significant antitrust case has endorsed
the section 403 test, and the Hartford Fire Insurance decision reduced the significance of
section 403 as a useful or acceptable theory. 509 U.S. at 764.
53. THiRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 416. Jurisdiction to prescribe or legislate is
specifically limited by section 403 in section 416(2), which adds three additional interest
balancing provisions related to the uniqueness of the securities markets. No significant
securities case has used interest balancing, and interest balancing under this Restatement
section has been ignored.
54. There have been only a few significant securities fraud cases since the adoption of the
Third Restatement in 1987. In fact, the decision most likely to have used the Restatement's
list of limitations, the Ninth Circuit's 1983 decision in Grunenthal, occurred several years
before the Restatement. See 712 F.2d at 421. The court did not refer to Professor
Lowenfeld's Hague Lecture suggestions, but this is not unusual as the Hague Lectures are
rarely referred to in U.S. cases. Usually, they are presented not with the idea of influencing
the future shape of the law in the presenter's country, but rather as an intellectual challenge
for the multinational audience to think about a subject in manner different from the norm.
Professor Lowenfeld's Hague Lectures certainly have achieved that goal.
55. The case also was decided before the Lowenfeld Hague Lectures in 1979.
56. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), on remand, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D.Cal. 1983), af'd,
749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
57. Id. at 611-12. The factors that the court considered relevant for its jurisdictional rule
of reason approach include:
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the
parties and the locations or principal places of business of corporations, the extent
to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the
relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those
elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American
commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the
violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct
abroad.
Id. at 614.
The court considered the effects test to be only a prelude to a comity analysis of
respective interests. Id. at 613. Indeed, the court only believed that there needed to be some
effect on commerce, allowing a very nominal effect which contrasts with the substantial effect
required under the line of decisions following the effects test theory. Id. at 612. The court's
application of the interests test is perhaps the best evidence to date of its shortcomings.
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As we will see, with regard to international securities fraud decisions
regarding subject matter jurisdiction, the Ninth and Second Circuit Courts of
Appeal are not only a continent apart geographically, but also philosophically. 58
The imberlane decision obviously brought forth considerable
comment. 59 One concern with Timberlane was its insignificant effect in the
United States, which suggested no need to undertake interest balancing. The
decision seemed to substitute the interest balancing test for the effects test.
The more appropriate method would be to first determine whether there were
sufficient effects in the United States to apply antitrust law, and then consider
interest balancing as a means of limitation either on jurisdiction or on going
forward. While Timberlane may have pleased jurists who support this part
of the Restatement, it contributed to the development of inconsistent views
among the various federal circuits. Although the Ninth Circuit's interest
balancing theory has been accepted in several circuits, 0 it has been
questioned or ignored in others.6' Timberlane's value was diminished by
the enactment in 1982 of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act
(FTAIA).6 2 The FTAIA, which seems largely ignored by those scholars and
judges who are determined to develop interest balancing theory, provided that
the challenged conduct in export commerce or wholly foreign conduct must
have a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on U.S.
domestic commerce, or on the trade of a person who is engaged in export
commerce.

63

58. The denial of certiorari in Timberlanedoes not constitute an expression of acceptance
of the Ninth Circuit's interest balancing theory, nor is it a rejection of that theory.
Timberlane, 472 U.S. at 1032.
59. See Jo Rachel Backer, Sherman Act Jurisdictionand the Acts ofForeign Sovereigns,
77 COLUM. L. REv. 1247 (1977); Jean Bernstein, Recent Developments: Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of America, 4 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 97 (1977); Elizabeth H.W. Fry, Recent
Developments: Antitrust - ExtraterritorialJurisdiction Under the Effects Doctrine - A
Conflicts Approach, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 354 (1977); R. Roelofs, Antitrust Law:
Extraterritoriality- Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 701

(1977).
60. The most frequently cited decision is the Third Circuit case Mannington Mills, Inc.
v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). Interest balancing was used in
Mannington to reverse an early dismissal.

Id. The parties settled, perhaps to avoid the

difficult task in establishing interests under the test, as suggested by Professor Harold Maier.
Maier, supra note 7, at 589 n.4 1. Neither Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613, nor Mannington, 595

F.2d at 1301, required proof of a substantial effect in the United States caused by required,
privileged, or encouraged foreign actions. On remand in Timberlane, the district court
required proof of substantial effect, and its decision that the effect in the United States of
conduct in Honduras was minimal appears to have been important to the district court's
dismissal and circuit court's affirmance. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613; Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of Am., 574 F. Supp. 1453, 1467 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
61, The strongest criticism was in the D.C. Circuit in Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian
World Airlines , 731 F.2d 909, 913, 948-52 (D.C.Cir. 1984).

62. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1994).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(I)(A)-(B).
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The FTAIA does not apply specifically to import commerce, 64 but
courts seem unlikely to apply a test to give imports into the United States
greater protection than export commerce under the FTAIA. There seems to
be a reluctance to accept the idea that the FTAIA replaced the Timberlane
decision's unpredictable rule with a more specific and predictable, but
perhaps less ideal and aspirational rule. Although the opportunity was
presented, the FTAIA did not address interest balancing theory specifically
or international comity generally.
The impact of the FTAIA beyond its specific application to export trade
rests in the logic of the assumption that the "direct, substantial and
foreseeable" effect language is the norm for any extraterritorial application
of the antitrust law. 65 That of course does not preclude a court from (1)
finding such effect to exist as a result of foreign conduct, and (2) refusing to
go forward under principles of international comity. This process seemed to
be an alternative until the Supreme Court in the 1993 Harford Fire
Insurance decision severely restricted comity usage.' While that Supreme
Court decision postdated the 1976 imberlane decision by seventeen years,
other cases in the interim illustrated the increasing isolation of extensive
interest balancing under international comity and the diminishing value of
attempting to draft interest balancing guidelines.
One of the more forceful rejections of interest balancing came in the
1984 Laker Airways antitrust litigation.67 The Laker Airways litigation first
involved a suit brought in the United States by U.K.-chartered Laker Airways
against several U.S. and foreign airlines, including British Airways and
British Caledonian, which were both chartered in the United Kingdom.68
The complaint alleged predatory pricing on Laker routes, secret commissions
to travel agents to not book flights on Laker Airways, and attempts to
69
prevent Laker Airways from receiving loans.
The D.C. Circuit followed the effects test.7' The court rejected interest
balancing and suggested that the approach "is unsuitable when courts are
forced to choose between a domestic law which is designed to protect
domestic interests, and a foreign law which is calculated to thwart the

64. The House Report states that "it is important that there be no misunderstanding that
import restraints ... remain covered by the law."

H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 9 (1982)

(prepared statement of James R. Atwood, Apr. 8, 1981).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1)(A)-(B).
66. HartfordFire Insurance, 509 U.S. at 798-99.

67. The principal decision in the United States is Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 909, which
also contains a lengthy discussion of international comity. The principal decision in England
is British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, Ltd., [1984] 1 Q.B. 142, [1985] 1 App. Cas. 58.
68. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 909.

69. Id. at 917.
70. Id. at 915.
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implementation of the domestic law in order to protect foreign interests
allegedly threatened by the objectives of the domestic law."'" Courts
increasingly are faced with interpreting legislative expressions of strongly
expressed domestic interests that effectively nullify judicial interest
balancing.72
The Laker Airways decision would seem to leave few if any domestic
legislative statutes, including the securities fraud laws, outside its scope, since
every legislative enactment seems to be based on some "domestic interest."73 The more difficult determination is what constitutes a foreign
nation's expression of an intention to "thwart the implementation of the
domestic law in order to protect foreign interests. 7 4 The Laker Airways
decision nevertheless suggests that whether or not there is such foreign
legislation, interest balancing is inappropriate.
Another significant group of antitrust cases that rejected interest
balancing after l1mberlane involved the In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation.75 The Westinghouse company sold nuclear power plants to numerous
power companies in the United States and abroad. To assure these sales,
Westinghouse also contracted to provide uranium for long terms at rates that
soon thereafter proved to be so far below the increasing market price that
Westinghouse could not fulfill its agreements. As one defense to breach of
contract claims, Westinghouse argued that there was an international uranium
suppliers cartel: therefore, Westinghouse was relieved of performance under
frustration of contract theory.76 In attempts to establish the cartel theory by
obtaining evidence abroad, much of which was frozen by blocking statutes,
a Federal District Court in Illinois rejected the Second Restatement's interest
balancing approach, stating that "[a]side from the fact that the judiciary has
little expertise, or perhaps even authority, to evaluate the economic and social
policies of a foreign country, such a balancing test is inherently unworkable
in this case."77

71. Id. at 948.

72. There may be no clearer case than that expressed in the U.S. legislation regarding
trade with Cuba through third-nation affiliates and subsidiaries. The United States Cuban
Democracy Act of 1992 and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 include
powerful statements of U.S. interests. See generally 22 U.S.C.A § 6021 (1996). Blocking
statutes of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Norway, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom express equally clear domestic interests.
73. 731 F.2d at 937-48.
74. Id. at 948.
75. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
76. Id.
77. Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. at 1148. The court also noted that "[t]he
competing interests here display an irreconcilable conflict on precisely the same plane of
national policy." Id. This view was shared in the United Kingdom associated litigation,
where Lord Wilberforce stated, "It is axiomatic that in antitrust matters the policy of one state
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol10/iss3/4
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Laker Airways and In re Uranium were two of the most complex
international antitrust litigations of the past two decades. These early 1980s
experiences seemed to have had little effect on the development of section
403 of the 1987 Third Restatement.7 8 They underline the fact that the
interest balancing theory of section 403 is an interesting exercise at most, that
is, a benign theoretical blip on the intellectual continuum of academe,
essentially useless as a dispute resolution assist for resolving the most
important international litigation that had occurred over the past decades.
B.

Hartford Fire Insurance

The attempt of the Third Restatement in 1987 to supply principles for
resolving complex litigation involving the extraterritorial application of U.S.
law received its most serious shock six years later in Hartford Fire
Insurance.7 9 The case has been criticized for failing to apply the "reasonableness" test of section 403 of the Third Restatement, 80 accused of misunderstanding the Restatement,8 ' and praised for having buried the purported
test. 82 The latter two views have been challenged.83

may be to defend what it is the policy of another state to attack." Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] App. Cas. 547, 617. It is this author's belief that these
statements would equally, if not more so, apply in civil law nations, where the judiciary's
discretion is more restrained than in the United States and some other common law nations.
78. See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 403 reporter's notes (citing several of the
Uranium and Laker decisions, but making no reference to the comments in those cases
rejecting interest balancing). Although the notes to section 415 on jurisdiction to legislate in
antitrust matters refer both to Timberlane and its sole important follower, Mannington Mills,
nowhere do they refer to the Laker decisions, the Uranium litigation, or federal circuits that
had not accepted the ideas of Timberlane and Mannington Mills. Id. § 415 reporter's notes.
79. Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 764.

80. See David G. Gill, Note, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 88 AM. J. INT'L
L. 109, 114 (1994). Gill further criticizes what he views as the court's failure to consider the
fact that a case involving private plaintiffs should be analyzed differently than one involving
a government plaintiff. Id. In HartfordFireInsurance the plaintiffs were both private and
government. HartfordFire Ins., 509 U.S. at 764.
81. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Conflict, Balancing of Interests, and the Exercise of
Jurisprudenceto Prescribe:Reflections on the InsuranceAntitrust Case, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.

42, 50 (1995). Professor Lowenfeld, who helped prepare the brief for the losing side, attempts
to elevate the Restatement to the level of "Aristotle, the Bible, the Koran, the American
Constitution, and other authorities" in his defense of § 403 and explanation of how the
majority got it wrong. Id. at 48.
82. Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law: The Demise of
Restatement Section 403, Editorial Comment, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 53, 57 (1995).
83. Larry Kramer, ExtraterritorialApplication of American Law After the Insurance
Antitrust Case: A Reply to ProfessorsLowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 750 (1995).

Professor Kramer suggested that the Court, in its first opinion on the application of the
Sherman Antitrust Act to conduct abroad with intended effects in the United States,
overlooked its earlier EEOCv. Arabian American Oil Co. opinion, which established a general
principle of territorial jurisdiction for all U.S. federal laws in the absence of contrary intent.
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Har ford Fire Insurance involved a claim by plaintiffs, who included
nineteen states and some private parties, that the London defendants had
violated U.S. antitrust law by conduct occurring in England that involved
their refusal to offer reinsurance to cover certain pollution damage claims to
the U.S. insurers.8' The London defendants did not deny such conduct
(refusal to reinsure) nor that there was a consequent direct and substantial
effect.8" Rather, their defense was that their conduct was legal in London
under a regulatory scheme adopted in England, and that imberlane,
Mannington Mills, and the Restatement provided the legal principles to limit
the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction. 86 It was a defense that overlooked the questionable value of Timberlane, Mannington Mills, and the
Restatement after the enactment of the FTAIA and the Laker Airways and In
re Uranium Antitrust Litigation decisions.
As expected, the Ninth Circuit turned to its earlier Timberlane ruling and
applied an interest balancing test. 7 Judge Noonan, writing for the Ninth
Circuit, further recognized the "significant conflict" the case created with

499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). There is a debate over the intent of the Sherman Antitrust Act, but
at the time of its enactment it did not address a foreign issue, but exclusively a domestic problem. Professor Kramer expected that lawyers for defendants in future cases involving the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law, such as the securities laws, would argue the Aramco
decision. That did not appear to be the case in Butte Mining (discussed below), where the
district and circuit courts make no reference to Aramco.
Professor Kramer also noted the confusion over the meaning of subject matter
jurisdiction and jurisdiction to prescribe, concluding that the Court's ruling appeared to be that
extraterritoriality of U.S. law is a question of subject matter jurisdiction (jurisdiction of the
federal courts arising from the Constitution, laws or treaties) rather than prescriptive
jurisdiction (the authority to apply the law to particular actions). Kramer, supra, 750 n.3.
84. Hartford FireIns., 509 U.S. at 764. In the view of some observers of the industry,
this created an insurance crisis in the United States because the inability of insurers to obtain
reinsurance resulted in the primary insurers refusing to insure, which in turn resulted in the
demise of enterprises. But see Richard N. Clarke et al., Sources of the Crisis in Liability
Insurance, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 367, 369 (1988).
85. HartfordFire Ins., 509 U.S. at 798. With the wisdom of hindsight, such defenses
should have been presented, at least in the alternative. Further surprising is the apparent lack
of a defense arguing that customary international law would not allow the exercise of
jurisdiction in this case.
86. InsuranceAntitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 919. Because the litigation was in the federal
district court in San Francisco, which is in the Ninth Circuit which had rendered the
Timberlane decision, such a defense seemed appropriate at the time. Both the district court
and circuit court applied interest balancing, although each in its own fashion. Insurance
Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 919; In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464 (N.D.Cal.
1989). However, the applicability of interest balancing as assisting or replacing rules of
international comity was not fully, if even significantly, accepted in the United States. Since
the U.S. Supreme Court had not yet spoken on the matter, a defense based on other circuit's
views would have seemed prudent.
87. Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 919. The application of law by the circuit
court, and earlier by the federal district court, share the same shortcomings regarding interest
balancing as did Timberlane.
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U.K. law and policy, and suggested that this conflict was outweighed by the
"significance of the effects" and "their foreseeability and their
purposefulness" on U.S. commerce.88
Although interest balancing was applied, it was subordinated to the
effects. Judge Noonan to some extent resurrected the importance of the
extent of the effect in the United States, which Tlmberlane had minimized in
its focus on interest balancing theory. Granting certiorari, the U.S. Supreme
Court was given the opportunity to measure the success of the framers and
supporters of the Restatement theory in changing U.S. law from an effects
theory to a comparative interest theory.8 9 That group did not fare well and
is now relegated to minimizing the impact of the Hartford Fire Insurance
decision in reducing interest balancing theory, at least for the near future, to
a footnote in the history of the development of resolving international
conflicts arising from the extraterritorial application of law.
Justice Souter, writing for the majority in HartfordFireInsurance, stated
that there was only one question, "whether 'there is in fact a true conflict
between domestic and foreign law.' ,90 He thought that a U.S. court should
not engage in interest balancing unless there is a true conflict between the
law of the United States and the law of the foreign state. 9' A true conflict
would exist only when the U.S. party is required by the foreign law to violate
U.S. law, or when it is impossible for the party to comply with the laws of
both the United States and the foreign state.92
Justice Scalia, writing for the dissent, thought this a "breathtakingly
broad proposition, which ...[will cause] the Sherman Act and other laws
...[to] conflict with the legitimate interests of other countries." 93 Justice
Scalia preferred the use of the interest balancing factors of the Third
Restatement's section 403 and thought they would "rarely ...point more

88. Id. at 934.

89. Or to an effects plus comparative interests theory, except that with the addition of the
latter, courts have sometimes overlooked the former in their haste to deal with interest
balancing.
90. Id. at 765, 798 (quoting Soci~td Nationale Industrielle Mrospatiale v. United States
Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
91. Id. at 799.
92. Id. This statement sounds very close to, if not the same as, foreign compulsion
theory. Under foreign compulsion, a state would not require a person to act in a foreign state
in a manner prohibited by the law of the foreign state, or to refrain from acting in compliance
with a requirement of that foreign state. However reasonable it may sound, it has not been
uniformly accepted or applied. See United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1034 (2d Cir.
1985) (rejecting foreign compulsion); Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 936 (rejecting foreign
compulsion); United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 345-46 (7th Cir.
1983) (accepting foreign compulsion).
93. Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 820.
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clearly against application of United States law."94 Justice Souter did not
specifically reject the Restatement, but without so stating, apparently reserved
its use to situations presenting the undefined "true conflict. 9 5
A troubling element is that true conflicts may be creatively formulated.
A true conflict indeed may have existed in HartfordFire Insurance,but may
not have been made clear, 96 for example, the British government directive
to the London insurers to act as they did is more conflict raising than when
the insurers act alone, without a government directive. The government
directive would raise a clearer defense of foreign compulsion. Justice Souter
must have meant that there is some form of true conflict creation that falls
short of foreign compulsion, otherwise his ruling seems to have merged a
conflict of jurisdiction with foreign compulsion. 97
Justice Souter may have meant that a court should act in a different way
in each of three situations. First, where there is no conflict of any significance, there is no international rule to be applied at all. The U.S. statute is
applied according to its intent. Second, where there is a significant conflict
which is less than a true conflict, customary international law would allow
a considerably greater exercise of subject matter jurisdiction than is provided
in the Third Restatement's section 403.98 Third, where there is a true
conflict, another approach is appropriate. It is not clear what that is.
On the one hand, the court might undertake some comparative interest
analysis, most likely with the Restatement as a guide. Thus, the Restatement

94. Id. at 819.

95. Id. at 820. Justice Souter does not explain how a true conflict is to be resolved. One
might suspect that interest balancing analysis of some form might occur. When it does, the
Restatement provides as thoroughly considered a test as has been developed, although
Professor Lowenfeld's Hague Lectures also admirably address the theory. See generally
Lowenfeld, Hague Lectures, supra note 43. However, where there is a true conflict, the two
nations' interests may be so clearly expressed by legislation that a national court will feel
compelled to follow the legislature's intent. In such event, perhaps the Restatement's foreign
compulsion rules in § 441 will require some amendment to explain the meaning of "In
general," which prefixes each part.
96. There certainly was a conflict regarding the policy towards the conduct of the London
insurers. The conduct was prohibited in the United States but permitted in the United
Kingdom.
97. Professor Lowenfeld suggests that
there is a significant space between such indifference of state B to a given activity
carried on in its territory as to remove all doubt about the reasonableness of the
exercise of jurisdiction by state A, and such compulsion by state B as would be
required to create a "true conflict" as defined by the majority in InsuranceAntitrust.
Lowenfeld, supra note 81, at 51.
98. Justice Scalia's dissent differs; he would turn not to customary international law but
to the Restatement's § 403, which speaks to the U.S. view of what international law ought to
be. 509 U.S. at 818-21. The Supreme Court has been criticized for its application of
customary international law. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655
(1992).
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would not have fully met its demise. 99 It has been left as a possible assist
when there is a true conflict. On the other hand, where there is a true
conflict, if that conflict is caused by a clash of clearly stated conflicting
national interests, perhaps the state must avoid interest balancing and return
to the first solution: to simply follow the law and ignore the foreign
interests. Although it is not a very diplomatic solution, it is perhaps the
better solution because it identifies a conflict between nations that should be
solved in a diplomatic forum rather than a judicial forum."° National
courts were never created to cure diplomatic conflicts. Such thoughts are
strengthened when one analyzes the defects of undertaking interest balancing
in a court. Interest balancing too easily becomes little more than one nation
identifying its interests and then referencing and discounting the importance
of the other nation's interests. Worse, it may cause a court to turn to a
castigation of specific elements of the foreign legal system, rather than
undertake a true balancing of the legitimate interests of the two nations.
The HartfordFireInsurance decision has left a troubling legacy. Future
lower courts will have to address the nature of a true conflict. Those who
were disappointed in the HartfordFire Insurance decision for its absence of
interest balancing will wish to expand the concept of "a true conflict."''
Those who are pleased that the court disregarded interest balancing may
prefer to confine the definition of a true conflict to where a foreign mandate
compels action (or inaction) by the person in violation of U.S. law, which
creates a defense of foreign compulsion. With the HartfordFire Insurance
decision now an important precedent, cases involving the extraterritorial
application of U.S. laws beyond the field of antitrust law must defer to its
directives. One such area is securities fraud.
III.

EXTRATERRITORIAL SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION IN

SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION

The first international securities fraud case of note was Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook1°2 in 1968. At that time, Professor Brewster's 1958 comments
and the 1965 Second Restatement's section 40 limitations on jurisdiction to
adjudicate were the only significant sources on which a court might have

99. See Trimble, supra note 82, at 57.
100. Perhaps an even better solution would be to retain it as a judicial issue, in an
international conflicts adjudicating forum, that would be better able to balance interests than
any one nation's domestic courts.
101. That is only if interest balancing analysis is the proper focus after a true conflict has
been established. That was not decided. The nearer a true conflict comes to foreign responses
raising the foreign compulsion doctrine, the less need there is for use of the Restatement's
interest balancing.
102. 405 F.2d 200, modified en banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968).
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relied on for interest balancing. Professor Lowenfeld's Hague Lectures and
the Third Restatement would not appear until 1979 and 1987, respectively
which also was true regarding what had been available to the court in
Timberlane in 1976.
The above history of the development of subject matter jurisdiction in
international antitrust litigation is essential to understanding the securities
cases that were decided prior to the HartfordFireInsurance decision and to
predicting how future courts will address this issue. Antitrust developments
began much earlier than those in the securities field.
A.

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934

The Securities Exchange Act (SEA) of 1934 is the federal legislative
source of governance of activities considered securities fraud. 0 3 The
principal theme of the SEA, as well as that of the Securities Act of 1933, is
disclosure." ° Disclosure is an essential feature of the securities fraud
provisions. Enacted in the midst of the great economic depression caused by
the stock market collapse, which began in 1929 and extended into the early
1930s, the securities laws were enacted to address domestic problems, similar
to the focus of the earlier enactment of the antitrust laws. The securities laws
were intended to protect domestic investors, which in turn was thought to
help assure a sound economy and successful domestic capital markets.
Nowhere in the statutory history was there any attention to the international
dimension of fraud in trading securities. But it did not take the courts long
to determine that the intent of Congress was to protect domestic investors
who had purchasedforeign securitieson U.S. exchanges, as well as to protect
the domestic securities market itself from the effects of foreign transactions
in U.S. securities.
The antifraud rules of the SEA are enforced both by federal actions
brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 10 5 and by
private actions under a judicially-created implied private right of action by
persons whom the SEA was intended to benefit.'
In using its power to
define conduct that constitutes deception or manipulation, the SEC issued

103. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1994).
104. The Securities Act of 1933 is a comparatively narrow enactment, which focuses nearly
exclusively on the issuance of new securities to the public. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(l). The SEA,
contrastingly, includes a broad range of provisions involving many areas of trading securities
and regulating securities exchanges and professionals. 15 U.S.C. § 78c.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a). The SEC was created by the SEA 1934 Act and has authority
to undertake actions in court, to act quasi-judicially, and to define improper conduct.
106. See generally Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.Pa. 1946) (first
announcing the implied right of a private action). It was confirmed by the Supreme Court in
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
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Rule lOb-5 in 1942, °7 which has become the most famous SEC pronouncement under its rulemaking power.'
The statutory authority for
Rule 1Ob-5 is the brief but broad antifraud principle in section 10 of the
SEA. 10 9 This provision makes no reference to international securities fraud.
But "interstate commerce" is defined in section 3(a)(17) of the SEA as
"trade, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States,
or between any foreign country and any State."" 0 Rule lOb-5, issued to
supplement section 10, makes no reference to international transactions."'
B.

JudicialEnforcement of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Judicial application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA) to
international transactions involving allegations of securities fraud began with
the same briefly expressed and unclear basis for subject matter jurisdiction
that was true with the Sherman Antitrust Act adopted in 1898."2 While
the first expression of an effects test basis to apply the Sherman Antitrust Act

107.
108.
acorn."
109.

Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5.
Rule lOb-5 is a "judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 738 (1975).
Section 10 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means
of instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange ...[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j, 78j(b).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17). Other evidence of congressional awareness of the possible
application of the SEA to international transactions is § 30(b), which is entitled "Foreign
securities exchanges" and essentially exempts fully foreign transactions. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b).
The sections states:
(b) The provisions of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not
apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the
jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts such business in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate to prevent the evasion of this title.
Id.

The rulemaking power granted to the SEC to bring these foreign transactions under the
SEA has not been used; no regulations have been issued. Section 30 has been raised as a
defense by foreign defendants, but has generally not been successful. In Schoenbaum, the
court stated § 30(b) "was intended to exempt persons conducting a business in securities
through foreign securities markets, . . . [but was not intended to exempt] extraterritorial
application of the Exchange Act to persons who engage in isolated foreign transactions." 405
F.2d at 207.
111. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
112. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

25

JOURNAL Law,
OF INTERNA
iONAL
LAW Art. 4
Florida JournalFLORIDA
of International
Vol. 10, Iss.
3 [1996],

[Vol. 10

to international transactions came in the 1945 Alcoa decision," 3 the first
the securities antifraud provisions was
opportunity to determine the test under
4
not until 1969 in Schoenbaum."
Schoenbaum involved the Banff Oil Company, a Canadian chartered
corporation, the shares of which were registered on the American Stock
Exchange and traded in the United States."' A U.S. shareholder brought
a derivative action in federal district court in New York City on behalf of the
Banff company against the Canadian members of the Board of Directors and
against the Aquitane Company of Canada, a wholly-owned subsidiary of a
French corporation. Aquitane had purchased treasury shares of Banff in
Canada, allegedly without prior disclosure of inside information that would
have increased the price and the benefit received by Banff. The defendants
argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the
transactions, which constituted the challenged conduct, had occurred in
Canada between foreign corporations. 16 Schoenbaum nevertheless was not
viewed by the circuit court as a very difficult case. The court did not believe
it was necessary to address some hard questions regarding conduct, because
Banff stock was registered on the American Stock Exchange, and there was
harm to U.S. persons.'
That connection alone made the company subject
to the SEA and granted the court subject matter jurisdiction."'
Other
factors, specifically foreign connections, which may have been quite
extensive, could not override both the important relationship established by
registration in the United States and the detriment to U.S. investors." 9 The

113. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443. As noted above, Alcoa essentially rejected use of the
territorial test of the earlier American Banana decision. Id.; see supra note 32 and
accompanying text (discussing the territorial test).
114. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 200 (2d Cir. 1968). The district court agreed that the SEA
was not to apply extraterritorially, referring to § 30(b) and its exemption for fully foreign
transactions. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The circuit
court would begin to diminish the possible scope of § 30(b). Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 207.
Effects in the United States would not make the transaction "completely" foreign. Id. at 20708. Schoenbaum was decided only a year after insider trading began to gain the attention of
courts in domestic securities fraud cases. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp.
262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd in part,rev'd in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
115. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 204-06

116. Id.at 204. This defense was accepted by the district court, which ruled that the SEA
did not have extraterritorial application. Schoenbaum, 268 F. Supp. at 385-86. The court
believed that nothing in the Act suggested an intent to have extraterritorial effect, a
presumption reinforced by Section 30(b). Id. at 392. The court further stated that in
determining Congressional intent, "choice of law principles are not determinative." Id. at 393.
The district court also held that the complaint failed to state a cause of action under Section
10 and Rule 10b(5). Id. at 390. The circuit court affirmed this portion, but with a dissent.
405 F.2d at 200, 214-15 (Hays, J., dissenting in part).
117. 405 F.2d at 208-09.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 208, 210.
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appellate court thus did not discuss the reasonablenessof any extraterritorial
application of U.S. law. 2
The court rejected the claim that no Americans were injured.12 Injury
to the foreign corporation reduced the equity of the shareholders, which
would be reflected in lower share prices on the American Stock Exchange.' 22 This was an impairment of value of American shareholders and
a sufficient effect on U.S. commerce to justify jurisdiction.'
The court concluded that there was subject matter jurisdiction where the
transactions involved stock registered on a U.S. securities exchange and were
"detrimental to the interests of American investors."'' 24 Although the
Schoenbaum appeal was before the important Second Circuit Court of
Appeal, the case did not offer a very appropriate opportunity for the court to
explore the margins of extraterritorial subject matter jurisdiction, because of
the connection of the Canadian corporation with the United States by means
of registration on the American Stock Exchange. 25 But another opportunity soon was presented to the same
Second Circuit in Leasco DataProcessing
126
Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell.
A U.S. corporation, Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp., acting
through its Netherlands Antilles incorporated subsidiary, Leasco N.V.,
purchased shares on the London stock exchange of Pergamon Press Ltd., a
U.K. corporation controlled by Robert Maxwell. 27 The purchase contract
was signed in the United States, where some meetings had been held to
negotiate the purchase. 28 The plaintiff Leasco claimed that they had been
fraudulently induced to pay an excessive price and brought suit against
British individuals and corporations. 29 Unlike in Schoenbaum, the shares
were purchased from a foreign corporation that was not registered on an U.S.
exchange. However, the negotiations and the contract execution occurred in

120. Extensive comments regarding § 30 disclosed the courts view that extraterritorial
effect was not precluded by the SEA. Id.at 207-08. Section 30(b) gave the SEC the
authority "to prevent evasion of the domestic regulatory scheme." Id. at 207. But the
decision did not address the dimensions of permissible extraterritorial effect. Nor did it
comment on the district court's view that choice of laws principles were not determinative in
determining congressional intent. See 268 F. Supp. at 387.
121. 405 F.2d at 208-09.
122. Id. at 208.
123. Id. at 208-09.
124. Id. at 208.
125. Those urging the use of interest balancing theory might disagree if they reject
registration on a U.S. exchange connection as singularly important, rather considering it only
one factor of state interest, which ought to be evaluated.
126. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
127. Id. at 1332.
128. Id. at 1331.
129. Id. at 1333. The wholly owned British subsidiary of Leasco, Leasco World Trade Co.
(U.K.) Ltd., was also a plaintiff.
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the United States. 3 ° These negotiations included fraudulent misrepresentations. This conduct in the United States was sufficient for the appellate court
to find subject matter jurisdiction. The fraud may have been partly induced
in England, but the execution of the contract was in the United States. 3 '
The court in Leasco focused upon a conduct test, which held subject matter
jurisdiction to exist where the conduct of the defendant in the United States
had some significance, at least more than being merely preparatory to the

fraud. 132
The "merely preparatory" language seemed to be the dividing line for
jurisdiction. If merely preparatory acts without more were a basis for subject
matter jurisdiction, the extraterritorial application of U.S. law would be
viewed abroad as just as extraordinary and unreasonable as is personal
jurisdiction based on the service of process on persons merely passing
through the United States. 133 The issue was becoming one of how much
conduct in the United States is sufficient to justify jurisdiction when the
larger part of the conduct occurs abroad. Not only the quantity of conduct
in the United States was important, but also the nature or quality of the
conduct justifying jurisdiction. Defining "merely preparatory" acts has not
been part of the development of antitrust subject matter jurisdiction theory,
although such development may occur if courts begin to focus more on the
existence of aspects 34of conduct and the effects test after the HartfordFire
Insurance decision.'
Only three years after Leasco, the Second Circuit decided two additional,
important cases involving international securities fraud allegations. The first,
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.,' 3 challenged alleged misrepresentations
and omissions in prospectuses used in the offering of stock in I.O.S., Ltd.
36
(IOS), a Canadian corporation that sold 'and managed mutual funds.

130. Id. at 1330-31. There were several meetings, first in New York, then in London,
again in New York, and finally another meeting in New York to execute the contract.
131. Id. at 1335.
132. Id. at 1337. This important language earlier appeared in Koal Industries Corp. v.
Ashland S.A., 808 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), where the court applied an effects test to
find subject matter jurisdiction where acts abroad caused substantial effects in the United
States.
133. The court noted that it would be difficult to find jurisdiction when there was no
evidence of fraudulent conduct in the United States and the purchase of the securities occurred
abroad. 468 F.2d at 1334.
134. 509 U.S. at 764. For further discussion, see supra text at notes 80-102.
135. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
136. Id. at 974, 978. IOS was initially organized by Bernard Cornfeld and some associates.
It later came under the control of Robert Vesco. At the time of the case, Vesco was a fugitive
living in Costa Rica. Both Comfeld and Vesco had numerous difficulties with securities
authorities, as had Robert Maxwell, principal defendant in the above Leasco case. Whether
or not the participation in international securities transactions by persons with records or
reputations of alleged securities fraud influences courts is beyond the scope of this article.
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Bersch, a U.S. citizen, representing himself and other persons from several
countries, filed suit against IOS as well as some individuals.'3 7 Acts
preparatory to the fraud had occurred in the United States' 38 but the actual
alleged fraudulent act occurred outside the United States. The appellate court
ruled that acts that were merely preparatory or were "culpable nonfeasance"
and therefore, relatively small in comparison to the acts that had occurred
abroad, could not be the basis of subject matter jurisdiction. 39 The court
found sufficient conduct to justify subject matter jurisdiction with respect to
the U.S. residents or citizens who were purchasers.'O The conclusion of
the court included three observations on when the securities antifraud
provisions apply to international transactions:
(1) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident
in the United States whether or not acts (or culpable failures to act)
of material importance occurred in this country; and
(2) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident
abroad if, but only if, acts (or culpable failures to act) of material

137. Id. at 974. The action was brought as a class action with possibly as many as 50,000
members from numerous countries. There were alleged to be 386 U.S. purchasers. Id. at 978
n.2.
138. Id. at 985 n.24. While these actions may seem extensive and sufficient for subject
matter jurisdiction, when viewed in the context of the entire transactions, they were clearly
"preliminary or ancillary to the work done in Europe." Id.
139. Id. at 987. The district court had found subject matter jurisdiction due to three
factors: (1) activity in the United States principally in the form of underwriting, counseling,
and accounting services in connection with an offering by Drexel; (2) sales to an estimated
386 Americans, although the defendants tried to prevent any sales to Americans and none
occurred in the Drexel offering; and (3) generally adverse effects on the U.S. securities
markets from the decline in the price of the lOS shares. Id. at 983-84 (citation omitted).
The circuit court addressed each of these three factors. Id. at 987-93. As to the first,
the court suggested these activities were more involved in making the gun than firing it. In
addition, the firing took place abroad. These acts were "merely preparatory" or assumed the
form of "culpable nonfeasance." The court considered the second factor as raising questions
as to how U.S. citizens (both in the U.S. and abroad) were able to subscribe to shares,
concluding that there were "some mailings of prospectuses into the United States and some
reliance on them." The court felt that for the U.S. purchasers in-the United States, subject
matter jurisdiction could be based on the misleading statements sent to those purchasers in the
United States. As to Americans purchasing the securities abroad, there would have to be
significant activities in the United States on the part of the defendants. The court accepted
the district court's conclusion that such sales might have been based on the primary offering
activity in the United States which was necessary for a successful sale abroad to Americans.
Finally, even though the third factor may have occurred, the court determined that the effects
were insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction. Interestingly, the court referred to the
antitrust Alcoa decision for this brief treatment of an effects test. The court noted, consistent
with the developing effects test, that there would have to be intent to offer securities to
persons in the United States (or perhaps to Americans anywhere) to apply the effects test.
140. Id. at 992-94. This reduced the class and also eliminated the court's concern about
absent foreign plaintiffs.
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importance in the United States have significantly contributed

thereto; but
(3) Do not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners
outside the United States unless acts (or culpable failures to act)
within the United States directly caused such losses.14 '
The Bersch court recognized that the coverage of the law might be
viewed as "greater, or less" than the court had concluded, which suggests the
court had used its "best judgment as to what Congress would have wished
if these problems had occurred to it."' 4 2 The rule from Leasco that merely
preparatory conduct (or minor conduct in contrast to the conduct abroad) is
insufficient for jurisdiction (unless the purchasers were Americans resident
in the United States) was given added status by Bersch. 43 It was given
further support in another securities fraud case decided by the same three
judges in the same court on the same day in 11T v. Vencap, Ltd.'44
Brought by the Luxembourg investment trust, UT, against the Bahamian
corporation, Vencap, and several individual defendants, the case also dealt
with the troubled dealings of 1OS Much of the activity in 11T involved
Richard Pistell, a U.S. citizen, residing in the Bahamas and engaged in
investments and finance. The lengthy facts outlined the activities of Pistell,
which involved the President (U.S. citizen) of Incap, a U.K. corporation that
managed some of the investments of 1OS, including in UT, located in the
Bahamas, and the organization of a venture capital firm, Vencap Ltd., also

141. Id. at 993. The court noted that the Securities Act and its legislative history offered
little help in reaching its conclusions, Congress having passed the provisions in the midst of
a depression when they could hardly foresee international transactions involving offshore funds
thirty years later. The court further stated that "[o]ther fact situations, such as losses to
foreigners from sales to them within the United States, [were] not before [the court]." Id.
142. Id. at 993 n.44 (citing Richard Mizrack, Recent Developments in the Extraterritorial
Application of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 30 Bus. LAW. 367
(1975)); Comment, The TransnationalReach of Rule lob-5, 121 PENN. L. REv. 1363 (1973).
143. The Bersch court did state that "neither Schoenbaum nor Leasco was decisive." 519
F.2d at 985. The court thought Bersch to raise a different and "serious" problem (being a
class action) of the effect of a judgment for the defendants or an inadequate judgment for the
plaintiffs on absent foreign plaintiffs. Id. at 993-94. Also of concern was the effect on such
absent foreign plaintiffs of a binding settlement. There was no assurance that a judgment
would be recognized abroad as binding all members of the class.
While the conduct did not reach the level to assert jurisdiction, there had been sufficient
foreign conduct with an accomplished intent to have an effect in the United States. Acknowledging a potential conflict, the court stated, "An analogous problem is presented here insofar
as the United States may be asserting jurisdiction in order to apply its laws to activities that
more properly are the subject of regulation by other sovereign states, and which currently are
the subject of litigation there." Id. at 989 n.35.
The Butte Mining litigation two decades later would involve such a situation and
illustrate how such conflict might impact these developments of subject matter jurisdiction.
144. Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1018.
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located in the Bahamas. 4
The circuit court was concerned with the
analysis of the evidence in the district court and suggested that the lower
court was "plainly wrong on the-facts" in one instance, 4 6 wrong in
weighing conflicting evidence, and generally lacking in the "precision"
needed in establishing how the alleged fraud occurred.'47 It concluded that
"we cannot look with favor on a series of 'findings' which simply adopt
plaintiff's accusations and leave Pistell's explanations unmentioned and
undecided,"' 48 which had led the district court to conclude that it had
subject matter jurisdiction. The circuit court undertook its own lengthy
reconstruction of the events and found little support to the view that Pistell's
activities had a significant effect in the United States merely because IT
allegedly had some U.S. fundholders.
There were some 300 U.S.
fundholders, but they constituted at most only .5% of the total IIT
fundholders. Unlike Bersch, any fraud on these U.S. fundholders was
practiced indirectly against the trust in which they invested. The court
thought the U.S. citizens' holdings were too small to apply the U.S. securities
laws to Pistell, who acted in London and defrauded a British investment trust,
which had only .5% U.S. fundholders, by selling it foreign securities."'
These U.S. investors in a fund that acquired shares that were not intended to
be offered to U.S. residents or citizens, did not raise the case to the level of
"substantial effect" within the United States that the Restatement had
suggested as the appropriate standard. 5
The conduct that occurred in the United States also was important to the
issue of subject matter jurisdiction. One of several meetings between Pistell
and the President of Incap was held in the United States, and some legal
work for IIT's subscription to Vencap shares was performed in New
York.' 5 ' Following its earlier decisions, the court would not allow merely
preparatory activity or the failure to prevent fraudulent acts in the United
States to be the basis of jurisdiction where the "bulk of the activity" was
undertaken abroad. 52 What transpired in the United States "simply

145. Id. at 1004-05.
146. Id. at 1007.
147. Id. at 1009.
148. Id. at 1010-11.
149. Id. The court suggested that such activity fell short of the Schoenbaum decision's
formulation of the SEA's protection to domestic investors who purchase foreign securities on
U.S. exchanges, and to the domestic securities market from effects of improper foreign
transactions in U.S. securities.
150. Id. at 1017-18 (citing SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 18(b)(ii)).
151. Id. at 1018. This work may have pertained only to some limited and technical aspects
of the preference share terms. The court expressed concern with being unable to "ascertain
exactly what was done - by whom, when, and where." Id. at 1006 n.7.
152. Id. at 1018.
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formalized what seems to have been a deal worked out in the Bahamas.' ' 3
However, after Vencap received IIT's investment capital, Vencap's activities
in the United States increased. It appears to have used New York as its base
of activities. The court thought that these acts could be regarded both as
evidence of Pistell's fraudulent intent, and as substantive acts which
consummated the fraud."5 The case was remanded for additional findings
on the conduct in the United States.
The Leasco, Bersch, and Vencap decisions provided a fairly uniform
standard, at least in the Second Circuit. The focus was on the location,
nature, and amount of the conduct. Where conduct in the United States was
merely preparatory or minor in comparison to conduct abroad, there would
be no subject matter jurisdiction. In contrast, the Second Circuit's antitrust
law decision in Alcoa has required that there be both conduct abroad and an
intended substantial effect in the United States, which is a view that has
1 55
continued, but has been subject to some criticism.
The early securities fraud decisions of the Second Circuit were more
involved with where the conduct occurred, which had not been a major issue
in Alcoa. If some significant part (at least more than preparatory activities)
of the antitrust acts that were challenged in Alcoa had occurred in the United
States, there might not have been any focus on effects. Clearly, conduct in
the United States in violation of U.S. law allows subject matter jurisdiction.
The United States has an interest in prohibiting violations of its antitrust and
securities laws occurring in the United States, even when the effects are
abroad and cause injury exclusively to foreigners. When there are insufficient acts within the United States to constitute the minimum amount of
conduct necessary for jurisdiction, which is often the case with international
antitrust activities, the emphasis shifts to effects within the United States.
Bersch and Vencap were decided in 1975. At that time, there had been
no significant international securities fraud decisions outside the Second
Circuit that gave any hint that the line of reasoning in the Second Circuit
would be viewed as an incorrect interpretation of the securities laws. The
Second Circuit had been referred to by Justice Blackmun of the U.S.
Supreme Court as "the 'Mother Court' in ... [the securities] area of the
law."' 56 The Second Circuit also held this status in the international
antitrust area, which is illustrated by its Alcoa decision.
The Second Restatement in 1965 had included some interest balancing
theory, developing Professor Brewster's 1958 ideas. However, those

153. Id.
154. Again, the court felt the district court's decision was unclear, and the case to be in
need of further findings.
155. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443-44.
156. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975).
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provisions were applicable to jurisdiction to enforce, not legislate. It is thus
not surprising that the securities cases discussed above had not referred to
interest balancing theory in references to the Second Restatement.' 5 7 In
1976, the year after Bersch and Vencap, the Ninth Circuit decided the
antitrust law imberlane case and raised the likelihood that given an
opportunity, the circuit might apply its interest balancing theory to securities
law cases as well.' 58 But Bersch and Vencap, building on Leasco and
Schoenbaum, had been fine tuning international securities fraud law in a way
that might make it difficult for other circuit courts to make significant
departures from the Second Circuit's opinions. The Alcoa antitrust decision
was three decades old when Timberlane was decided. If there been a similar
refinement of Alcoa in the antitrust law area in the years between Alcoa and
Timberlane, the Timberlane court might have been more moderate. But the
Ninth Circuit has never paid homage to the Second Circuit, its distant cousin
across the continent.
As securities cases began to be contested in circuits other than the
Second, the tests developing in the Second Circuit were generally accepted
and applied. Two years after the Bersch and Vencap decisions, the Third
Circuit addressed SEC v. Kasser.1 9 In Kasser, the SEC, seeking an
injunction, claimed that several individual defendants (a California corporation and a Delaware corporation, both principally owned by a U.S. national,
Kasser) defrauded and made misrepresentations to a Canadian incorporated
fund, owned by a Canadian province. The defendants allegedly induced two
companies, one incorporated in Canada and the other in the United States, to
invest in the fund. In a complex "ponzi"-like scheme, the defendants fraud
and misrepresentations resulted in the bankruptcy of the two corporations."6 A number of the acts occurred in the United States, including
some of the allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations.' 6' The circuit court
found "significant conduct" occurring in the United States. It also thought

157. The court in Leasco referred to the Second Restatement § 18 as suggesting that a state
had jurisdiction to prescribe extending to foreign conduct with an effect in the United States.
Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1333-34. The court was concerned with the intent of Congress, not
interest balancing. Id. at 1334. The court in Bersch discussed the Second Restatement §§ 1718, also in search of the intent of Congress, noting that "it must seek to determine whether
Congress would have wished the precious resources of United States courts and law
enforcement agencies to be devoted to them [foreign transactions] rather than leave the
problem to foreign countries." Bersch, 519 F.2d at 985 (alteration in original). Vencap also
mentions the Restatement in its search for Congressional intent. Vencap, 519 F2d. at 1017.
158. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 611.
159. 548 F.2d 109, 110-11 (3d Cir. 1977).
160. See generally Christopher R. Leslie, Den of Iniquity: The Case for Equitable

Doctrines in Rule lob-5 Cases, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1587 (1993) (discussing Ponzi schemes).
161. 548 F.2d at Ill. The court cited the district court's listing of five specific acts
occurring in the United States. The circuit court added three of its own.
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it was "questionable" whether there was any effect in the United States. 62
The district court previously had dismissed the complaint because the
"essentially foreign transactions [were] without impact in this country,' 63
acts....
and the conduct in the United States was "merely miscellaneous
' 64
transaction.'
the
of
nature
foreign
the
alter
not]
did
[which
The appellate court turned briefly to its own decision only the year
before, in Straub v. Vaisman & Co.,65 which found jurisdiction over an
American broker engaged in fraudulent sales to nonresident foreigners,
because "[c]onduct within the United States is alone sufficient to apply the
The Kasser court recognized Straub as
federal [securities] statutes."'"
being quite different because the shares in the Straub fraud were traded on
an American exchange. 67 What is troubling is the court's use of a
statement from Straub that the conduct in this country, standing alone, is
enough for jurisdiction."6 To expand this into a view that merely preparatory acts in this country are sufficient would be not only a mistaken
interpretation of the Straub decision, but establish a conflict with the line of
Second Circuit Court decisions. It was to these decisions that the Kasser
court turned to next.
The court referred to the two written decisions of Judge Friendly, Bersch
and Vencap, as "[p]erhaps the leading opinions which have delved into the
problem of jurisdiction."' 16 Finding Vencap to be more supportive, the
court was impressed with the fact that the Second Circuit had suggested that
the conduct in the United States might have been sufficient for jurisdiction,
but had remanded the case for further inquiry. 7 Emphasizing that Judge
Friendly had found "little factual support for [finding any] . . . significant
effect in the United States,"'17' the court stated that "Judge Friendly
declared that jurisdiction still could exist."' 72 Judge Friendly discussed in
detail why the nominal effect in the United States alone was insufficient for

162. Id. at 112.
163. Id. (quoting 391 F. Supp. at 1177).
164. Id. One might suspect that this would point to the Canadian law as being more

appropriate to resolve the issue, but the Kasser court did not view the issue as one of choice
of law, but of congressional intent. Id. at 114.
165. 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976).
166. Id. at 595 (citing the SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 17).
167. 548 F.2d at 113 (citing Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 200, where the shares were also
listed on an U.S. exchange); see supra notes 114-125 and accompanying text for further
discussion. Even from a choice of law perspective, U.S. law seemed the proper choice
because of the numerous links with the United States.
168. Kasser, 548 F.2d at 113.
169. Id. Judge Friendly also had written the opinion in Leasco.
170. Id. (citation omitted).
171. Id. (quoting Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1016).
172. Id. (citation omitted).
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jurisdiction. He did not then state that "jurisdiction could still exist," nor
imply that if it means basing jurisdiction on merely preparatory acts when the
effect was nominal." He shifted to a discussion of activity within the
United States, and stated, "Our ruling on this basis of jurisdiction is limited
to the perpetration of fraudulent acts themselves and does not extend to mere
preparatory activities or the failure to prevent fraudulent acts where the bulk
of the activity was performed in foreign countries, such as in Bersch."'74
The Kasser court then suggested that Vencap required "substantial or
even some impact in this country."' 75 Judge Adams use of the word
"impact" is sometimes confusing, since he seems to use it to mean "effect"
or "conduct." The court next stated that the securities laws "do grant
jurisdiction . . . where at least some of the activity designed to further a
fraudulent scheme occurs within this country."' 76 That was never in doubt,
since conduct "designed to further a fraudulent scheme" should mean more
than merely preparatory acts. The court supports this by stating that it
declined "to immunize ... defendants who unleash from this country a
pervasive scheme to defraud a foreign corporation," words which clearly
require more than merely preparatory acts. 77 Although one may view
Kasser as treading upon the merely preparatory language, the court held the
conduct in the United States not to be merely preparatory, but more
substantial than the conduct that occurred in Vencap. The court also found
sufficient evidence that the acts in the United States were sufficient to have
"directly caused" the losses. 7
Kasser is generally categorized as a
departure from the Second Circuit's view, and it does contain language that
79
occasionally "drifts" from the merely preparatory standard.

173. Id.
174. Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1018. At this point Judge Friendly stated that the fraud theory
presented suggested a lack of significant activity in the United States, but that other theories
using further acts of Vencap needed exploration, and remanded for further findings. Id.
175. Kasser, 548 F.2d at 113.
176. Id. at 114.
177. Id. Judge Adams next comments are troubling. He notes that Vencap "did narrow
its decision somewhat by. . . 'not extend[ing jurisdiction] to merely preparatory activities."'
Id. (quoting Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1018). Vencap did not do that narrowing, such basis for
jurisdiction came directly from Leasco and Bersch.
178. Id. The court stated that the defendant's conduct in the United States was "essential
to the plan to defraud the Fund." Id.
179. This is true of the court's final paragraphs, when it states that upon remand dismissal
should be granted if "the allegedly fraudulent conduct of any of the defendants within this
country was nonexistent or was so minimal as to be immaterial." Kasser, 548 F.2d at 116.
This seems to lower the test the court had earlier applied using Vencap and Bersch.
The court also discussed policy implications of finding jurisdiction in such cases in its
closing page. Id.at 116. It feared that a holding of no jurisdiction might cause similar
responses from other nations in similar cases, while finding jurisdiction raises the "prospect
of reciprocal action against fraudulent schemes aimed at the United States from foreign
sources." Id. at 116. It felt that if merely preparatory actions do count, reciprocal action could
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The Kasser decision's final comments on policy might be viewed as
judicial interest in considering how other nations will react to a particular
ruling. But the court never went beyond a few brief comments. It did not
refer to the Second Restatement, and 1imberlane was not yet available. The
Third Circuit has not since revisited the securities fraud area. Subsequent
decisions in other circuits have identified Kasser as a departure from the
Second Circuit,'8 0 which was followed later by the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits. But the difference between the circuits may be less in the required
mix of conduct and effects than in causation. The Second Circuit's
requirements for conduct as the basis of subject matter jurisdiction seem to
look more to linking the conduct with the elements of a violation of Section
10(b) of the SEA and Rule lOb-5, than does the more permissive view,
adopted by the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. These circuits require
conduct that is "in furtherance" of a fraudulent scheme, but the conduct may
not necessarily constitute elements of a Section 10(b) or Rule 1Ob-5
violation.
The next significant case in the United States was decided by the Eighth
Circuit in 1979. In Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific
Oilseeds, Inc.,181 the securities fraud was alleged to have resulted from
activities undertaken in the United States and to have had effects in
Australia.'82 In reviewing the district court's dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, the court turned to the several Second Circuit decisions
and to Kasser in the Third Circuit. Reversing the district court, the circuit
court found "the scheme of fraudulent nondisclosure devised in the United
States ... [to be] conduct significant enough to establish subject matter
jurisdiction." '83 The court further stated its view was consistent with
Section 17 of the Second Restatement, and that the decision was "largely
based on policy considerations. ' '
Without the presence of helpful

mean foreign courts might find subject matter jurisdiction over U.S. nationals who have performed only merely preparatory acts in the foreign country and have not caused any
substantial effect in that country. Is that the kind of reciprocity we ought to be seeking?
180. The emphasis in the decision is expressly on the Second Circuit precedent,
notwithstanding the comments that might lead to a later preference for an expansion of
jurisdiction into acts that are "merely preparatory."
181. 592 F.2d 409,414 (8th Cir. 1979). In Continental Grain, the Eighth Circuit presented
an analysis that the court called consistent with Vencap, and dismissed the complaint on
subject matter grounds because the acts in the United states were "preparatory or secondary"
to the fraudulent conduct abroad.
182. Id. The facts were not disputed, but their jurisdictional significance was.
183. Id. (emphasis added). The court thought that in this case, and in similar transnational
securities cases, the same facts address both the question of whether there is subject matter
jurisdiction, and whether there is sufficient use of the mail or interstate commerce to meet the
jurisdictional requirements of Section 10 of SEA.
184. Id. at 415-16.
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guidance from the legislative history, the court thought general principles of
international law, the language of the securities statutes, and the remedial
purpose of the statutes were judicially-accepted guides to subject matter
jurisdiction.' 5
Acknowledging two principle theories applied in the previous cases,
conduct (subjective territorial) and effects (objective territorial), the court
noted a lack of uniformity in application.1 s6 It chose the view, already
supported by the cases discussed above, that either test was a legitimate basis
for subject matter jurisdiction and that both tests did not have to be met.
Using Section 18 of the Second Restatement for support, the court had little
trouble finding the effect within the United States to have been insubstantial
and too remote.8 7 Turning to conduct in the United States as the second
test, referring to Leasco as authority, the court found the U.S. conduct to be
an "essential link in the perpetration of the fraudulent transaction."' 8'8 After
extensively discussing the Second Circuit quartet of decisions, the court
turned to Kasser, which the court suggested "extended the boundaries of the
necessary domestic conduct required to find subject matter jurisdiction" from
Bersch and Vencap. Is9
The court referred to the "'at least some

185. Id. For authority that the courts have used international law principles to decide
jurisdictional issues, the court quoted from a student note in an international law journal, a
surprising source of authority. See Note, The ExtraterritorialApplication of the Antifraud
Provisionsof the SecuritiesAct, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 137, 139, nn. 12-16 (1978). Whatever
value there might have been in the court's comment, the Supreme Court's Hatford Fire
Insurance decision 14 years later would raise doubts about the usefulness of principles of
international law in deciding subject matter jurisdiction in all but a very few instances. See
supra notes 80-102 and accompanying text. The Continental Grain court seemed to prefer
as sources several law review notes on the extraterritorial application of securities laws, as
opposed to the considerable experience that went into the Second Restatement. 592 F.2d at
416. Although the court noted its agreement with the Second Restatement § 17, it apparently
preferred to add more recent law review commentary about what courts had actually done.
Id. at 415-16.
186. Id. at 416. After referring to the Bersch three part test, the court suggested in a
footnote that in reality courts may use a more flexible approach, "balancing the competing
interests presented." 592 F.2d at 416 n. 11 (citing three student works: Note, American
Adjudication of TransnationalSecurities Fraud,89 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1976); Comment,
Transnational Reach of Rule 10b-5, supra note 142, at 1370-91; cf Comment, Jurisdiction
in TransnationalSecurities FraudCases - SEC v. Kasser, 7 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 279,
286 n.46 (1978)). The case did not attempt to balance interests. Giving the conduct and
effects tests the imprimatur of an international law basis seems to be the court's way of
implying that no matter how it might subsequently apply one of those tests, the decision
would have the support of international law.
187. Id. The court thought the nationality of the defendants (California corporation and
California resident) lacked independent significance for the purpose of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. (citing Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1016).
188. Id. (citing Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1335). "Essential link" would certainly seem to meet
the more than merely preparatory standard.
189. Id. at 418.
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activity' " 90 comment in Kasser, and to its conclusion that "'there was
significant conduct"' within the United States in support of its position.'9 '
The court viewed Kasser as consistent with the court's own (Eighth Circuit)
Travis decision, where the court based subject matter jurisdiction on the
finding of "'significant conduct"' in the United States.' 92 This hardly
seems a diversion from of the Second Circuit's repeated views on what
constitutes conduct. It is more an adoption of those views. What was a
diversion, however, was the court's rejection of language of Bersch
"interpreted to require that the domestic conduct constitute a rule 1Ob-5
violation."1 93 The court next turned to the domestic conduct and said that
it could not be "merely preparatory" and must "directly cause the losses."
The facts in Continental Grain outlined conduct in the United
States that the court believed met that test and that disclosed a "fraudulent
scheme of nondisclosure was devised and completed in the United
States." 9 5 While the court found "significant" conduct in the United
States, when it acknowledged that subject matter jurisdiction in the United
States is "largely a policy decision,"' 96 it added that the case involved "a
substantially foreign transaction, little if any domestic impact, and domestic
conduct which consisted for the most part of use of the mail and telephones."' 97 That use was nevertheless significant, and the court further
stated that its finding was not '.an extension of previous cases."' 9'
Continental Grain added the Eighth Circuit to the Third Circuit in
essentially following the conduct test views established in the Second Circuit.
While one may find language in both Kasser and Continental Grain that
suggests the appropriateness of a less demanding test of conduct than applied
in the Second Circuit, the court in each case found sufficient significant
conduct in the United States that was more than merely preparatory. In so
finding, the courts avoided having to define and justify allowing merely
preparatory conduct to be the basis of subject matter jurisdiction. The court
in Continental Grain noted that even where there is significant conduct in the
United States, the conduct may be little more than the use of the mail and

190. Id. (quoting Kasser, 548 F.2d at 114).
191. Id. at 419 (quoting Kasser, 542 F.2d at 111-12).
192. Id. (quoting Travis, 473 F.2d at 524).
193. Id. at 418. The court acknowledged an extension of the boundaries of the required
conduct by such rejection, but viewed it as consistent with Kasser.
194. 592 F.2d at 420 (quoting Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1018 and Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993,
respectively).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 421.
197. Id.
198. Id. "Like the Second Circuit, we are reluctant to conclude that Congress would have
intended the securities laws to have a global reach when the domestic conduct is insubstantial
or the domestic impact is too generalized or insignificant." Id.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol10/iss3/4
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telephones and may be overshadowed by the extent of the activities
abroad.'
This position approaches the margin of reasonable jurisdiction,
but obviously depends more on the substance of the use of the mail and
telephones than merely the presence of the use. However close these two
circuits had come to diluting the standard of the Second Circuit, the standard
clearly had been important to the courts, which preferred to identify their
decisions with the decisions of the Second Circuit rather than break out into
new territory. But a clearer differentiation would soon appear in a decision
by the California-based Ninth Circuit, which is perhaps the most adventurous
circuit court in the United States. z°°
Grunenthal GmbH v. Holtz involved the sale of foreign securities
between foreign corporations and foreign individuals."0 ' The district court
had found the only conduct in the United States to be "a mere repetition of
misrepresentations first spoken abroad.""2 2 The circuit court reversed and
found a single meeting of the foreign defendants in Los Angeles, where
misrepresentations originally made abroad were repeated, to be sufficient for
subject matter jurisdiction.2 3
The Ninth Circuit wandered nearly as far astray in Grunenthal from
established subject matter jurisdiction theory in the securities fraud case as
it had a few years before when it decided the antitrust case, Timberlane.z°
The departure perhaps was even more significant in Grunenthal, since there
were the four Second Circuit decisions and single decisions from the Third
and Eighth Circuits, which in the aggregate appeared to have established a
clear policy mandating more than merely preparatory conduct in the United
States for subject matter jurisdiction." 5 But Judge Reinhardt believed his
reasoning was consistent with both ContinentalGrain, which he stated "best

199.
200.
by one
421.
201.
202.

Id.
Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1983). This case was addressed
of the Ninth Circuit's most self-professed liberal judges, Stephen Reinhardt. Id. at
Id. at 422.
Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 511 F. Supp. 582, 588 (C.D.Cal. 1981). The district court

had referred to the Second Circuit precedent because the Ninth Circuit had no controlling
precedent and it believed "the Second Circuit's approach to subject matter jurisdiction was 'in
keeping with ... [that in] the Ninth Circuit.'" Grunenthal, 712 F.2d at 423 (quoting 511 F.
Supp. at 588).
203. Grunenthal, 712 F.2d at 425.
204. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 597. The departure was of course different. Timberlane
adopted interest balancing theory. Grunenthal did not go that far, although the subsequent
Restatement might imply it should have. In Grunenthal the departure was the essential
elimination of "significant" from the requirement of "significant conduct" for jurisdiction.
205. Timberlane, on the other hand, had only one significant decision to consider, the
nearly 30-year-old Alcoa case.
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satisfies ... [the] objectives" of the federal securities laws,2" and with
Kasser. Little credit was given to the Second Circuit developments, other
than suggesting that the decision was not inconsistent with the approach of
the Second Circuit. Judge Reinhardt was concerned with the intent of
Congress and stated that assertion of jurisdiction in this case, which involved
no U.S. parties, would encourage U.S. lawyers, accountants, and underwriters
who might be involved in international securities sales "to behave responsibly
and thus may prevent the development of relaxed standards that could 'spill
over into work on American securities transactions.'" *27 The foreign
participants were to be punished as a warning to Americans. 218 In concluding that the conduct, the sole meeting in the United States, was "significant"
and "furthered the fraudulent scheme," Judge Reinhardt merged the meaning
of "merely preparatory" and "significant" and sent a warning to foreign
to avoid even the
parties engaged in international securities transactions
2 °9
slightest contact with the Ninth Circuit's turf.
Why would the Ninth Circuit, which had adopted the interest balancing
theory in antitrust litigation in Timberlane, not consider an interest balancing
theory in Grunenthal? Interest balancing was used in a few antitrust cases
when conduct abroad was intended to and did have a significant effect in the
United States. If Grunenthalhad involved conduct abroad causing significant
effects in the United States rather than conduct in the United States, the
Ninth Circuit court might have found interest balancing appropriate.2 10

206. Grunenthal, 712 F.2d at 424. Using the objectives sought by the legislation is
appropriate when the language of the law is not clear, quite certainly the case with the
Securities Act when the limits of subject matter jurisdiction are at issue.
207. Id. at 425 (quoting Note, American Adjudication of TransnationalSecurities Fraud,
supra note 186, at 570-71). It seems hard to accept that this was an "American securities
transaction." It appeared to be the location in the United States that established the sufficient
link, not the nationality of the lawyers. What if the law firm offices had been a Paris branch
of the Los Angeles firm? The desire to send a warning to the lawyers would not diminish by
the different location. Would Judge Reinhardt have nevertheless ruled the same?
208. The court thought that to rule otherwise would "make it convenient for foreign
citizens and corporations to use this country and its lawyers, accountants and underwriters to
further fraudulent securities schemes." Id.
209. The court found it meaningful that the meeting was held in the Los Angeles law office
of Grunenthal's counsel, even though it acknowledged that it is unknown whether any lawyers
were present at the meeting or perhaps even passed by the door while the meeting was in
progress. Id. at 425 n.7.
210. If the Third Restatement had been adopted prior to Grunenthal(the Restatement was
adopted four years later in 1987), Grunenthal would not seem consistent with the Third
Restatement § 416. Section § 416(l)(d) bases jurisdiction to prescribe in securities matters
on conduct "occurring predominantly in the United States." TMRD RESTATEMENT, supra note
9, § 416(1)(d). Were the language of the Restatement to reflect the law, it would include
"merely preparatory" as the dividing line in the majority of circuits. "Predominantly" is
presumably equated to conduct more than "merely preparatory." But predominantly addresses
quantity, while merely preparatory addresses quality.
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The Third Restatement, adopted four years later, would attempt to extend
comparative interest theory to subject matter jurisdiction in securities
litigation whether it was based on effects or conduct. 21 ' The Reporters'
notes suggest that in contrast to antitrust litigation, which often involves
conflicts between permitted or prohibited activity, securities litigation "has
not resulted in state-to-state conflict. 2 This view perhaps remains true
where the issue is foreign regulation mandating conduct prohibited in the
United States, but is not true, as the Reporters' notes state, with regard to
securities discovery,2 3 and has proven not to be true with the Lloyd's of
London insurance litigation involving United States "names, 2 " nor with
the conflicts over the "natural forum" as discussed infra in the Butte Mining
litigation. 1 5
Between Grunenthal in 1983 and the recent Butte Mining -litigation
decisions in 1995-1996, two federal circuit courts, which had not previously
spoken, aligned themselves with either the Second or Ninth Circuits. The
D.C. Circuit in Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co. 21 6 followed the Second
Circuit, in which Judge Bork articulated a preference for the "more restrictive
test., 217 In suggesting that the court should inquire as to "what jurisdiction
Congress in fact thought about and conferred" rather than "what 'Congress
would have wished' if it had addressed the problem," 21 8 Judge Bork added
a footnote that indicated the counterproductiveness in attempting to use a
balancing test when determining Congressional intent, because it was not

211. TnRD

RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 416(2)(a).
212. Id. § 416 n.3.
213. Id. § 416 n.5.
214. The dispute has involved differences in opinion regarding the need of Lloyd's of
London to register with state securities departments before it solicited names for membership
in various Lloyd's syndicates.
215. See infra text at notes 251-89. The Butte Mining litigation leaves one with little
reason to think that a garden variety securities fraud case involving foreign persons cannot rise
to a nation-to-nation conflict, if the foreign person is able to convince it's own nation's courts
to grant an antisuit injunction.
216. 824 F.2d 27 (D.C.Cir. 1987).
217. Id. at 31. Judge Bork thought that the Third, Eighth and Ninth Circuits had "relaxed"
the Second Circuit's test, referring to Continental Grain'srejection of the Second Circuit's
requirement that" 'domestic conduct constitute the elements of a rule lOb-5 violation.'" Id.
(quoting 592 F.2d at 418). In a concurring opinion, Judge Wald said, "I therefore wish to
distance myself from the majority's labeling of these courts' efforts as an attempt to usurp the
role of Congress," because those circuits had been exercising a proper role in interpreting the
meaning of a statute with little legislative history. Id. at 37.
218. Id. at 32 (citation omitted). The "would have wished" language was from Bersch,
which Judge Bork otherwise tended to approve. Judge Bork clearly prefers determining the
intent of Congress by addressing the language of the statute, rather than peremptorily
dismissing the intent as unclear and turning to what purpose the statute was trying to achieve.
The latter form of judicial interpretation may encourage the judge to momentarily discard the
judicial robes and envision himself sitting as a legislator.
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clear that applying such a test would be a wise expenditure of U.S. judicial
resources, experience in attempting to balance interests had proven to be
difficult in application, and the tests were "inherently unpredictable."219
In a ruling three years later, MCG, Inc. v. Great Western Energy
Corp.,220 the Fifth Circuit noted the different views among the circuits and
indicated no preference for a restrictive or a liberal view. 22 ' The court
referred to the views developed in the Second Circuit and the "more relaxed"
standard of the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits that allows jurisdiction
when the conduct is not necessarily fraudulent itself but occurs in the United
States in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme. 2' The facts did not require
the court to choose between the two developing theories. The court affirmed
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where the plaintiff's conduct,
rather than that of the defendant, was in question. The plaintiff had
employed a scheme to avoid U.S. securities laws, to participate in a foreign
offering from which plaintiffs were disqualified, and then to gain the
protection of the securities laws.223
While these other circuits have addressed the subject matter jurisdiction
issue, securities fraud cases continued to come before the Second Circuit.
Three cases of some significance after Bersch and Vencap generally
continued to follow the Second Circuit's strict approach and bring us up to
date. The court in Consolidated Gold Fields Plc v. Minorco, S.A.,224 found
"sufficient effects" in the United States to justify subject matter jurisdiction. 22' The British chartered Gold Fields Corp. held significant natural
resource exploration, mining, and marketing properties in the United States.
These interests were in the form of wholly owned or partly owned (but
controlled) U.S. chartered corporations. Nearly thirty percent of Gold Fields
Corp. was owned by Minorco, which was chartered in Luxembourg and
mostly owned and controlled by two entities: (1) Anglo, a South African

219. Id. at 32 n.2 (citing Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 948-52, and essentially rejecting the
then nearly completed Third Restatement's interest balancing provisions). Judge Bork also
cited the argument that interest balancing was "not faithful to the principle of comity," and
"deemphasized foreign sovereign interests"; in addition such balancing usually did not lead
a court to decline to accept jurisdiction. Id.(citing Note, Predictabilityand Comity: Toward
Common Principles ofExtraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98 HARV.L. REV. 1310, 1323-25 (1985)).
220. 896 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1990).
221. Id. at 175.
222. Id.
223. The court stated that having gone to considerable lengths to structure the transaction,
however lawful such structure might be, the plaintiffs should not be allowed to "wrap
themselves in their protective mantle when the deal sours." Id. The defendants knew nothing
about the actions of the plaintiffs in avoiding the securities laws.
224. 871 F.2d 252, 255 (2d Cir. 1989).
225. The court referred only to the line of Second Circuit decisions to allow subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. at 262.
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corporation, and (2) De Beers. The latter two corporations owned 39.1% and

21% of Minorco, respectively.22 6 Minorco wished to acquire the remaining
70% of Gold Fields, about 2.5% of which was owned by U.S. residents.2 7
Offering documents were not sent to shareholders in the United States, but
they were sent to the U.K. nominees of U.S. resident shareholders. 28
Thus, the tender offer occurred exclusively abroad and affected a small
percentage of U.S. residents. Plaintiffs were both the target Gold Fields and
some of its controlled entities in the United States.229
They brought challenges under both the antitrust and securities laws.23 °
Because there was no conduct in the United States, the court focused on the
effects test. The earlier Bersch court had allowed subject matter jurisdiction
where only 22 U.S. residents purchased 41,936 shares, which was barely
more than one percent of the 3,950,000 shares offered. 3' While in Bersch
it was only assumed that the documents were transmitted to the U.S.
shareholders, in this case the tender documents were clearly so transmitted.
That constituted a "direct and foreseeable result of conduct" abroad and
satisfied the effects test. z32 The court also noted it would be inconsistent
with Bersch to rule otherwise.
Two years later the same court decided Alfadda v. Fenn,2 33 and used

226. The Oppenheimer family of South Africa apparently controls Anglo and De Beers,
and thus Minorco.
227. The 2.5% constituted about 5,300,000 shares. Only about 50,000 were held directly
by residents, 2.15 million shares through the ownership of American Depositary Receipts
(ADR), and 3.1 million through nominee accounts in the United Kingdom.
228. Id. at 262.
229. Id. at 252.
230. The district court rejected the securities fraud claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, but allowed injunctive relief on the antitrust claim. Consolidated Gold Fields,
Plc. v. Anglo Am. Corp., 698 F. Supp. 487, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The circuit court upheld
the antitrust claim, and reversed the securities fraud decision. ConsolidatedGold Fields, 871
F.2d at 263.
231. ConsolidatedGold Fields, 871 F.2d at 262.
232. Id. (citing THIRD RESTATEMENT § 402(1)(c)). The court made note of interest
balancing provisions of § 403(2)(b) and (g) only as an added reference to its comment on
enforcement jurisdiction, citing principally § 431(2) of the Restatement. It further noted that
international comity might suggest nonenforcement when the "extraterritorial effect of a
particular remedy is so disproportionate to harm within the United States," as had been argued
in an amicus curiae brief by the SEC, but the court left this determination to the district court
on remand. Id. at 263 (citing Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3rd
Cir. 1979); Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 597; THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 431; and
contrasting Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 909). On remand the district court did little to
enhance the usefulness of interest balancing, only briefly considering the international
interests. Consolidated Gold Fields, Pic. v. Anglo Am. Corp., 713 F. Supp. 1457, 1464
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); see Case Note, Application of US. Law to Foreign Transactions-Antitrust
Law - Securities Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 923 (1989).
233. 935 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1991).
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the conduct test to find subject matter jurisdiction.234 Consistent with
earlier rulings, the court held that the conduct had to be more than merely
preparatory, but this holding seemed to depart from the Bersch requirement
that the conduct directly cause the plaintiff's loss.2 35 The conduct appeared
to have occurred after the fraud had been perpetrated, rather than to have
been part of the perpetration. But the court believed that the prospectuses
"did not become fraudulent" until additional shares were sold.236 The
negotiations and sales included conduct within the United States. Judge
Lumbard referred to the Restatement section 416(d),237 allowing jurisdiction
where there is conduct occurring "predominantly" in the United States, "even
if the transaction takes place outside the United States., 238 The "predominance" of the conduct being in the United States was certainly subject to
question. It was more239a question of whether there was "sufficient" conduct
to justify jurisdiction.
The last significant Second Circuit decision was the 1995 decision, Itoba
Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC.24 Like both Minorco and Alfadda, the court
reversed a district court dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2 4'
Like several of the above decisions, the case involved a foreign corporation,
LEP Group, Plc, of the United Kingdom, which had deposited about ten
percent of its shares in a U.S. depository to create a market in the United
States. The resulting American Depository Receipts (ADR) were traded on
the NASDAQ and subject to reporting and disclosure requirements of the
U.S. securities laws. A Bahamas chartered company, A.D.T. Ltd., which was
registered on the New York Exchange and with about fifty percent of its
shareholders U.S. residents, owned Itoba, Ltd., which was chartered in the
Channel Islands. Itoba in turn was the parent of A.D.T. Securities Systems,

234. Id. The circuit court reversed the district court, which had held that the fraud had
been perpetrated "by placing the misleading prospectus into the hands of the plaintiff outside
the United States," a rather narrow interpretation of what constitutes the meaningful conduct.
Alfadda v. Fenn, 751 F. Supp. 1114, 1114 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
235. Alfadda, 935 F.2d at 475.
236. Id. at 478.
237. Id. at 479. Incorrectly identifying it as the 1987 "Second" Restatement. It is the
Third Restatement, despite the fact that there was no First Restatement.
238. Id.
239. There was also a RICO claim, which the district court had dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The circuit court reversed on this count as well, acknowledging
the lack of Second Circuit precedent on the issue, but concluding that the legislative intent in
enacting RICO was not to limit RICO to domestic enterprises, and finding sufficient acts
within the United States to justify jurisdiction. Id. at 479-80.
240. 54 F.3d 118, 120-22 (2d Cir. 1995).
241. Three different judges (Newman in Minorco, Lumbard in Alfadda, and Van
Graafeiland in Itoba) wrote the opinions in these three Second Circuit decisions. The district
courts are apparently having as much difficulty as law review notewriters in understanding the
standards being developed by the successive circuit court opinions.
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which was chartered in Delaware. A.D.T. Ltd. decided to jointly purchase
LEP along with a Canadian company, Canadian Pacific. LEP was evaluated
for Canadian Pacific by a London investment analysts and for A.D.T. Ltd.
by an in-house analyst. 4 2
A.D.T. Ltd. then had Itoba acquire LEP shares. Before the purchase was
complete, LEP disclosed some business reversals, its share price dropped
ninety-seven percent, and LEP's holdings by Itoba declined by about $111
million. Itoba's suit for securities fraud was against both LEP and its
officers.243 In reversing the district court, the circuit court turned to the
conduct test. Judge Van Graafeiland found the investment decisions, while
made abroad, relied partly on U.S. securities filings. 2" Since the decision
to purchase LEP shares was made upon recommendations partly based on
SEC filings, the SEC reports became a "substantial and significant cause" of
the purchase decision.245 The court stated that because SEC filings are the
"type of 'devices'" investors rely upon, the fact that the false and misleading
statement was made regarding a security that was not the security purchased
would not bar the action. 2' The court disagreed that making the false
statements in reports to the SEC was "merely preparatory., 247 The court
said the situs of the preparation of the report should not be decisive,
otherwise securities law protection could easily be avoided. There were
material, undisclosed facts in the report that created a duty to correct, which
was not fulfilled. This failure was not "incidental or preparatory, 24"
The Itoba court also found sufficient effects in the United States in the
form of trading of A.D.T.'s shares on the New York Exchange and the
possession of fifty percent of A.D.T.'s shares by U.S. residents. The court
seemed to acknowledge its doubt about the sufficiency of its ruling on either
conduct or effects grounds alone, by stating, "[W]e hold that a sufficient
combination of ingredients of the conduct and effects tests is present . . . to
justify ...jurisdiction. ' 24 9 Less than adequate fulfillment of each test
seems in sum to be sufficient to Judge Graafeiland, which is a view not
likely to be fully appreciated. This view might also cause cases where the

242. Id. at 118. Canadian Pacific abandoned plans to participate in the purchase, but the
in house analyst of A.D.T. Ltd. continued to use and rely upon the London financial report
made for Canadian. Pacific.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 122.
245. Id. Although the board members of Itoba had not read the SEC filing, derivative
reliance was sufficient.
246. Id. at 123. The reports evaluated the shares of LEP ordinary shares, not the ADRs.
The court noted the obvious linkage between the price of the ordinary shares in London, and

the price of the ADRs in the United States.
247. Id. Which decision the district court had avoided.
248. Id. at 124.
249. Id.
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conduct is merely preparatory to result in a finding ofjurisdiction if the court
also is able to find less than sufficient effects standing alone, but in
combination with the less than sufficient conduct to add up to jurisdiction.
The two lines of authority in the circuit courts outlined above, which
diverge less with regard to the nature of the effects test than with the
meaning of the conduct test and the need to prove conduct that caused the
securities fraud, will undoubtedly be addressed in some future Supreme Court
decision. The frequent overruling of district court rulings that dismiss actions
on subject matter jurisdiction grounds suggests that better guidance is needed
than that provided by in the circuit courts. There is not only a distinction
between groupings of circuits, but also in the view of district court judges,
a considerable lack of clarity within some of the circuits. While Supreme
Court assistance on the nature of the conduct test would be useful, the recent
decision in the Ninth Circuit in Butte Mining Plc v. Smith25 ° may have
begun to draw the two circuit court positions closer, if not checkmate the
Ninth Circuit's broadening of jurisdiction in Grunenthal.21 The Butte
Mining decision is especially important because, like some of the significant
recent antitrust decisions such as the Laker Airways litigation, it involves
separate cases addressing the same matter initiated in the United States and
in other nations. 25 2 Furthermore, the U.K. court ruling that the principal
plaintiff in the United States Butte Mining litigation must bring its actions in
the United Kingdom rather than the United States,"' raises far more
questions about the future of subject matter jurisdiction than are answered by
traditional choice of law norms, which some critics of the various circuit
above seem to believe would best resolve these
court decisions outlined
2- 4
conflicts.
jurisdictional
Butte Mining Plc initially commenced its securities fraud litigation in
May 1992, in federal district court in Montana on fraud and RICO
claims. 25" Butte Mining sued seventy-seven defendants, twenty-seven of

250. 76 F.3d 287 (9th Cir. 1996).
251. Such convergence is especially true ifAlfadda and Itoba are viewed as the adoption
of a more liberal attitude in the Second Circuit, now that Judge Friendly is no longer writing
opinions.
252. See id.; Simon Eng'g Plc v. Butte Mining Pic, [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 91, [1996] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 104 (Eng.).
253. Simon Eng'g, [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 91.
254. See generally Russell J. Weintraub, The ExtraterritorialApplication of Antitrust and
Securities Law: An Inquiry into the Utility of a "Choice-of-Law" Approach, 70 TEX. L. REv.

1799 (1992).
255. Butte Mining Plc v. Smith, 876 F. Supp. 1153, 1153-54 (D. Mont. 1995). The RICO
Act claims are a new element of securities litigation. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994). With
damages claimed of at least $325 million, the RICO Act would treble that to about $1 billion.
Of course, the securities fraud violations also might result in treble damages. The Butte
Mining suit was a shareholders' derivative action, and was taken by the lawyers on a
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whom were residents of or entities incorporated in England or Wales.256
The principal defendants were the Robertson Group Plc, Ltd. (three
companies acquired by Simon Engineering Plc in May 1991) and the auditors
Ernst & Young International. 257 A group of promoters who were citizens
of foreign countries, including England and Australia (referred to in the U.S.
action as the Control Group), formed some fifteen U.K. companies (referred
to as Controlled Entities), which in turn controlled fifteen Montana
corporations (referred to as the Montana Shell Corporations).2 5 One of
these companies, Montana Mining Properties Inc., a Montana corporation,
was to be the agent for a later formed public corporation intended to
purchase and lease mining properties and equipment in Montana. 259 There
was a stock swap outside the United States between Butte Mining and one
of the Controlled Entities, at an exchange rate that was not favorable to Butte
Mining. 26 Butte Mining shortly thereafter issued shares on the London
exchange at an inflated price with the condition that no shares could be sold
"'directly or indirectly, in the U.S. to or for the benefit of any North
American Person.' ' 26' But some of the shares went to a resident of
Montana, as partial payment for property he had originally sold. The
conduct in Montana was preparatory to the securities fraud; the alleged fraud
and losses occurred when the transactions were undertaken in England.
Six days after Butte Mining filed its action in Montana, Ernst & Young
brought an action against Butte Mining in England seeking professional fees
of over £300,000.262 In July, Robertson also sued Butte Mining in England, for failing to pay a bank overdraft that Robertson had guaranteed. In
October, the Montana court enjoined Ernst & Young from pursuing the
English action because the defense of Butte Mining would be the same as its
complaint in Montana. 263 Ernst & Young's appeal of that antisuit injunction was denied in May 1994. Butte Mining also had sought a similar
injunction against Robertson, but judgment was withheld since a decision was

contingent fee basis. The RICO charges were dismissed because the plaintiff did not allege
any effect on either U.S. citizens or securities markets. The English court would later view
the RICO charges as a remedy rather than a cause of action, and thus not raise the single
forum issue since England has no RICO equivalent.
256. Butte Mining, 876 F. Supp. at 1158-59. Twenty-four defendants did not enter an
appearance, twenty-six agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the English court.
257. Butte Mining, 76 F.3d at 188-89.
258. Id. at 289.
259. Id. at 288.
260. Id. at 289.
261. Id.
262. Simon Eng'g, [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 104.
263. Butte Mining Plc v. Smith, No. 92-36890, 1994 WL 192428, at 2* (9th Cir. May 17,
1994) (unpublished). The English complaint, in the view of the Montana judge, had to be
brought as a counterclaim in Montana.
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soon expected on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, and Robertson had
not proceeded with the English action.
In January 1995, the Montana district court dismissed the securities fraud
charges for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2' 6 The dismissal was under
both the effects test and the conduct test.265 The only comment made by
the Montana district court with regard to the English action was the next to
last sentence in the decision, stating that "[t]he anti-suit injunction issued by
this court on October 2, 1992, is dissolved. '' 21 The decision in no way
disclosed the serious conflict between Butte Mining and the two principal
defendants regarding the proper forum. If the district court had decided in
favor of subject matter jurisdiction, it would have had to address the issue of
forum non conveniens, which the defendants also had raised. That would
have brought the two nation's courts into sharper conflict. But the issue was
not over because of the appeal of Butte Mining.
Because Butte Mining stated its intent to appeal, the Simon group, which
had acquired the Robertson group, obtained an antisuit injunction in England
prohibiting Butte Mining and its attorney Lloyd-Jacob from pursing its claims
in the Montana action, including its appeal to the Ninth Circuit.267 Butte
Mining and Lloyd-Jacob requested that the English court discharge its antisuit
injunction.26 In February, 1995, the English Commercial Court in the
Queen's Bench Division of the High Court granted the injunction requested
by Ernst & Young and declined to set aside its previous injunction granted
to the Simon group. 269 The English court expressed the basis of restraining
foreign proceedings "where they are vexatious, in the sense of being
frivolous or useless, but also where they are oppressive. '27" Further, they
may be restrained when there are new circumstances such as the possibility
of bringing suit in a nation with "exceptionally broad jurisdiction and which
offer[s] great inducements, in particular greatly enhanced, even punitive,

264. Butte Mining, 876 F. Supp. at 1168.
265. The court referred to Grunenthal as a case where the "material misrepresentations
were made in the United States which induced the plaintiffs to execute a sales agreement,"
but thought all the conduct in Butte Mining occurred abroad. Id. at 1166.
266. Id. at 1168.
267. Simon Eng'g, [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 104.
268. Ernst & Young sought a similar injunction and the two interests were heard together.
269. Id. Butte Mining had not acknowledged that the litigation in England was on the
merits. The English judge, in addition to the antisuit injunction, gave orders for a speedy trial,
including ruling that the affidavits filed by the parties should be considered pleadings and
evidence. Simon Eng'g, [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 91.
270. Simon Eng'g, [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 104. The court later said the Butte Mining suit
in the United States was not vexatious, and focused only on the "oppressive" nature of the

Montana action.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol10/iss3/4

48

1996]

JUR1SD1CTION-INTL---SECURITIES
Gordon: United
States Extraterritorial Subject FRAUD
Matter Jurisdiction in Sec

damages.."271 The court said it would not grant an injunction were it to
deny the foreign plaintiff of advantages of the foreign forum. Acknowledging that the best court to determine whether a matter should proceed is the
court in which the action is brought, the court thought that this was an
"exceptional case," where justice required intervention.272
Turning to whether England or the United States was the "natural
forum," the court was influenced by the Montana district court's conclusion
that there was no subject matter jurisdiction.2 73 For additional reasons
common to forum non conveniens analysis, the court concluded that England
was the natural forum.274 The "oppressive" issue concentrated on several
elements of the legal system held in disdain in England, including punitive
damages, treble damages under RICO, contingent fees, high costs that were
not recoverable by the successful party,275 and the likelihood of a long
delay in the Montana court.
The uniqueness of the case was also of concern to the English court.
The U.S. case involved a lower court ruling dismissing the jurisdiction,
which concluded the matter in the way the English court thought to be
correct, whether under jurisdictional or forum non conveniens analysis, but
an appeal was pending.276 The English court considered the grounds of the
appeal, as well as the time and expense of the appeal. It found the delay of
the English actions by the appeal to itself be oppressive conduct. 27
The court found the treble and punitive damages, the contingent fees, and

271. Id. The court thought forum non conveniens would normally cause the foreign court
to exercise jurisdiction, protecting the plaintiff by a stay upon terms. The court rejected the
idea that an antisuit injunction could be based solely on the ground that England was the
natural forum, believing that would be inconsistent with comity. The court instead required
both a ruling that England was the proper forum, and that pursuit in the foreign forum was
vexatious or oppressive.
272. Id. The court also acknowledged that a court may be compelled to "give effect to the
policies of its own legislation."
273. Id. The Montana court did not reach the issue of forum non conveniens.
274. Although the court had suggested that the best court to determine whether it is a
natural forum is the court of that forum, it later suggested that it had not been convinced that
Montana was a natural forum.
275. This viewer of the English legal system has long considered the English to use cost
analysis, when considering changes to the legal system, far more extensively than do
Americans. For example, the lack of a voir dire in criminal proceedings is partly due to the
added cost. Adding costs differs from allocating costs, although allocating costs to the loser
tends to reduce overall costs of the system, because fewer suits are filed that are clearly
frivolous.
276. Id.
277. Butte Mining had not been willing to agree in England not to seek an antisuit
injunction in the Montana court preventing Ernst & Young and the Simon group from
pursuing the actions in England. Butte Mining preferred to rely on the Montana appeal, rather
than shift its fight to England where it had said it could not proceed because of the lack of
contingent fee arrangements.
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the use of a jury trial,27 gave Butte Mining an illegitimate advantage. It
would not be an illegitimate advantage were it to be a natural forum,
however, the court referring to a decision where both Texas and England
could be proper and natural forums.279 But where the foreign forum has
no connection with the subject matter, the English courts have ruled
differently.2" Rendering punitive and treble damages illegitimate is the
United Kingdom Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980, which disallows
enforcement of a foreign judgment with multiple damages.2"' The court
noted that absent the jurisdictional links with the foreign country that exclude
application of the Act, such damages justified their being considered
oppressive.
Turning to the contingent fee issue, the court suggested U.S. juries are
inclined to grant larger awards since plaintiffs must give so much over to
their counsel.2" 2 The court said that separate from this was the fact that
having Butte Mining's lawyers finance the action, plus the irrecoverability of
costs by successful defendants, is under the English view an illegitimate
advantage. The court finally considered both that certain claims against third
parties could only be pursued in England and the alleged lack of funds of
Butte Mining to pursue the matter outside the United States,2" 3 and ended
with what the court said was its "balancing exercise that the Court must
perform in the interests of justice."28 4 The English court concentrated on
the characteristics of the U.S. legal system that English jurists have long
disliked, and which differ significantly from how the English system
functions.2 85
The conclusion of oppression was not difficult to predict.

Such a

278. In England the trial would be before a judge without a jury, which is used for a very
limited number of civil actions.
279. Castanho v. Brown & Root (UK) Ltd., [1981] App. Cas. 557 (Eng.).
280. See Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A~rospatiale v. Lee Kui Jak (SNIA), [1987] App.
Cas. 871 (P.C. 1987). A suit had been brought in Texas, which ruled favorably to the plaintiff
on forum non conveniens grounds. Id. at 832. The U.K. Privy Council granted an antisuit
injunction, despite the Texas plaintiffs being willing to agree to a trial by judge alone, and to
accept the application of foreign law which did not allow punitive damages. Id. at 876. Such
agreements may reduce the level of oppression, but are not an assurance of acceptance by the
foreign court. Id.
281. See further discussion of this blocking law at supra note 24 and accompanying text.
282. Simon Eng'g, [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 91.
283. The court thought this neutral, referring to the large sums Butte Mining had spent
"squandering its resources" in Montana and preventing the English actions. Id. at 36. Butte
Mining's alleged inability to pursue an action in England proved illusory as it soon thereafter
filed suit in England. Butte Mining did not allege lack of funds at the hearing for a permanent injunction in England. Simon Eng'g, [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 91.
284. Simon Eng'g, [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 104.
285. See also MARY ANN GLENDEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A
NUTSHELL,

Part Two (1982).
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balancing test is not what has been suggested by the advocates of interest
balancing in the United States. The form of balancing advocated in the
United States looks to essentially positive economic, social, and political
interests of each nation, rather than using balancing to disparage the legal
system of the other.2" In March the English court dismissed an application
of Butte Mining to modify the injunction and file notice of appeal. The
Court of Appeal reversed and allowed that filing. In March, April, and May,
Butte Mining tried to expedite its U.S. appeal, but its persistence brought
only an order on May 23 to cease submitting further such motions." 7 In
October, the English Commercial Court made the antisuit injunction
permanent.8 8
If interest balancing by U.S. courts such as the Ninth Circuit's
TiImberlane decision is thought to be little more than a process by which a
court justifies a decision by excessive weight to its own nation's interests, the
interest balancing in this U.K. decision could be thought to be little more
than a process by which a court justifies a decision by weight of disregard
of or disdain for the other nation's interests. The use of such language as
"unjust" and "oppressive" when referring to aspects of a nation's legal
system are harsh and unlikely to be viewed as legitimate elements of interest
balancing.289 Timberlane in the United States and Simon Engineering in
the United Kingdom speak strongly for a more effective means of resolution
of extraterritorial application of laws.
What seems strange to this author is the Ninth Circuit's total lack of any
reference to the English proceedings when it heard the appeal of the Montana
district court decision. 290 Even though the case was argued on December
7, 1995, long after the English decision allowing the antisuit injunction,
Ninth Circuit Judge Noonan spoke only to the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction. The circuit court agreed that the effects test was not met, and
indeed the plaintiffs had not alleged any effects in the United States. The
court stated that Grunenthal established the governing principles for the

286. One might rather easily label the English system oppressive for failing to adopt the
very characteristics of the U.S. system it disparages since those characteristics all have quite
sound reasons for their presence even though they do not all function as intended. An
effective balancing of interests does not evolve from the English model of criticism for not
being more English.
287. Simon Eng'g, [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 91; Butte Mining, 76 F.3d at 287.
288. Simon Eng'g, [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 91.
289. The English court attempted to differentiate between such characteristics of the U.S.
civil process as contingency fees and discovery when the United States would be the only
natural forum. When England is the natural forum those characteristics become oppressive.
The court did not clearly answer the question about whether oppression existed when either
England or the United States were natural forums. Perhaps that does not occur under English
law. If England is a natural forum, is it therefore the only natural forum?
290. Butte Mining, 76 F.3d at 287.
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conduct test. 29 1 But if Grunenthal is to be read as a liberal departure from
the Second Circuit's line of cases, this new reading is very different. Judge
Noonan began by repeating Grunenthal'sbase of operations test, reaffirming
that the United States should not be used as a "haven for such defrauders and
manipulators. '292 The court thought that owning mining property in
Montana did not mean Montana was the operational base. 293 The court
also did not believe that it was significant that one of the defendants and his
lawyer were Montana residents. 29
Further, the court went through its Grunenthal test of "responsible
behavior" by lawyers, accountants, and underwriters and found no underwriters involved, and only insignificant involvement by accountants 295 and
lawyers.296 The final focus was on whether the conduct in the United
States was merely preparatory. Recognizing that "merely preparatory
[conduct] ... is not a basis for jurisdiction," the court stated that the
plaintiffs affirmed that the conduct in the United States was merely
preparatory by their own allegations. 297 But was it? It consisted of the
purchase of the Montana lands, the formation of the Montana shell
corporations to hold the acquired mining interests, payment of the Montana
seller of the land partly with Butte shares that were undervalued because of
the fraud, and use of "communications systems" in the United States.298
This conduct seems to have been more than enough to come under the
Grunenthaltest, but Grunenthal was not decided in the shadow of a hostile
foreign antisuit injunction. The court certainly knew of the English
injunction and that a decision in favor of Butte Mining would raise the level
of conflict between the U.S. and English courts.
Why is Judge Noonan's opinion in Butte Mining so different than Judge
Reinhardt's opinion in Grunenthal? Judge Reinhardt had little trouble in
finding subject matter jurisdiction on the slimmest of contacts with the
United States. There was no similar foreign litigation involving the parties

291. Id. at 290.

292. Id. (citing Grunenthal, 712 F.2d at 424-25).

293. Id.
294. Id. A Montana law office is apparently less significant than one in Los Angeles,

where the one act of significance in Grunenthal occurred.
295. Id. at 291. Accountants had given an opinion on the implications of the U.S. tax
laws. Had their opinion been different might the deal have been canceled, that is, was their

involvement an essential link to the final decisions?
296. The lawyer who participated in the initial sale. Apparently a Montana lawyer
participating in a substantive sales agreement is of less weight than a Los Angeles lawyer who
allows use of his office, without further participation, as in Grunenthal.

297. Id.
298. Id.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol10/iss3/4

52

1996]

Gordon: United
States Extraterritorial SubjectFRAUD
Matter Jurisdiction in Sec
JURISDICTION-INT'L-SECURITIES

in Grunenthal,2' and thus no likely hostile reaction to the finding of
subject matter jurisdiction. Perhaps Judge Noonan's decision is a disguised
decision based actually on forum non conveniens, impliedly accepting the
English court's conclusion that the United Kingdom was the proper and
natural forum, thereby avoiding having to address the oppression characteristics of the U.S. civil legal process. Judge Noonan may be more territorialist
in his approach to subject matter jurisdiction than is Judge Reinhardt. 3°
Perhaps of significance was the fact that after the English injunction was
made permanent on October 3, 1995, Butte Mining initiated an action in the
English courts for £100 million, contrary to its earlier claims that it could not
afford to pursue an action in England where contingent fees were not
allowed. Thus, when the appeal was argued before the Ninth Circuit in
December, that court must have known of Butte Mining's actions in the
United Kingdom. The litigation had for all intents moved to the United
Kingdom. The remaining link in the United States was hope for Butte
Mining that the Ninth Circuit would be consistent and find subject matter
jurisdiction as it had in Grunenthal. If that hope had been fulfilled, it would
have left Butte Mining to decide whether or not to go forward in violation
of the English order. As a U.K. company, it could not disobey an English
court order. Even if Butte Mining were to go forward, the English blocking
it from
laws would have limited discovery and would effectively block
30
reaching any assets in the United Kingdom to satisfy a judgment. 1
Butte Mining may reflect a decision by the Ninth Circuit to move away
from a liberal grant of subject matter jurisdiction to avoid a conflict with
foreign nations' interests. Alternately, the Ninth Circuit might retain the
liberal position it had developed in Grunenthalby addressing whether to go
forward under international comity or the Timberlane interest balancing.
However, if it retains the latter, the court must deal with the Supreme Court's
decision in Hartford Fire Insurance. If Justice Souter's "true conflict" in
HartfordFire Insurance includes the kind of conflict raised in Butte Mining,
does that mean interest balancing theory has survived? While there are no
answers as yet, there are some possible observations.
299. At least there was no similar foreign litigation of which this author is aware.
However, it would have been easy to miss the English litigation involving the parties in Butte
Mining, except for the brief reference to the antisuit injunction by the district court.
300. For a discussion by Judge Noonan (then Professor Noonan) of the American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co. decision, 213 U.S. 347 (1909), where Justice Holmes based his
decision on a territorial limitation to the application of a nation's laws, see supra note 33 and
accompanying text. But it was Judge Noonan who had used interest balancing in his opinion
in HartfordFireInsurance, which was reversed by the Supreme Court. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.
v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993)
301. Also, the clawback provisions of the U.K. law could have been applied by the
defendants, allowing them to recover any treble damages from a United States ruling out of
any assets of Butte Mining in the United Kingdom.
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IV. THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION
In the absence of the Hartford Fire Insurance and Aramco Supreme
Court decisions, and the U.K. Simon Engineering antisuit injunction, this
article would end with some suggestions on how the Supreme Court might
be expected to decide an appeal of a securities fraud subject matter
jurisdiction case and define the limits of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The
Court most likely would have followed the line of Second Circuit decisions.
It would have allowed jurisdiction if there were some level of effects or
conduct in the United States. One would hope that the court would define
more clearly what constitutes effects and conduct, especially where the line
between actionable conduct and merely preparatory conduct would be drawn.
Quite probably the Court also would require some linkage between conduct
and a violation of the securities fraud provisions, thus rejecting the deviations
in the Third and Eighth Circuits. If the question had arose, I suspect the
Court would have rejected interest balancing.
However, I believe the Court will be more forceful in a future ruling
because of the presence of the Hartford Fire Insurance and Aramco
decisions, and the Butte Mining litigation. I do not believe the outcome will
necessarily be different, but the Court's decision is likely to contain more
clarity both in rejecting or very severely limiting interest balancing and in
concentrating on defining the intent of Congress and probably the purpose of
the legislation.
How might each of these three cases or groups of cases affect a future
Supreme Court decision addressing extraterritorial application of securities
fraud laws? Let me offer a few thoughts.
A.

Hartford Fire Insurance v. California

I am inclined to favor Professor Trimble's observations more than those
of Professor Lowenfeld. But I believe it was an overstatement by Professor
Trimble to refer to the demise of section 403 of the Third Restatement. 2
It lies quite severely wounded, but it has strong supporters who will attempt
to nurse it back to health. Indeed, the good Dr. Lowenfeld, in his best
bedside manner, understated the extent of the injury.30 3 It is quite possible
that when the Supreme Court addresses a securities fraud extraterritorial
subject matter jurisdiction case, the court will not have to address section
403, because it may well deal with a case from a circuit that already ignores
that section. But the Court probably will have to deal with international law,

302. See generally Trimble, supra note 82.
303. See generally Lowenfeld, supra note 81.
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and may even, if confronted with the opportunity, limit subject matter
jurisdiction by the application of international comity rules without any
reference to the Restatement. What does seem clear is the Court will
consider the intent of Congress of primary importance, which leads us to the
possible reference to the Aramco decision.
Hartford FireInsurance will require some careful elucidation of Justice
Souter's "true conflict between domestic and foreign law ' 30 4 for a future
Court to reject exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction on international comity
grounds. The London insurers in HartfordFireInsurance neither argued that
English law required them to act in a manner prohibited by U.S. law, nor
claimed that compliance with the laws of both countries was not possible.
In a future case, defendants are likely to allege both that they are required to
act in a manner under their nation's law that is prohibited by U.S. law, and
further claim that compliance with the laws of both countries is impossible.
Furthermore, foreign nations may react to U.S. extraterritorial laws with
which they strongly disagree as to substance or remedies, with their own
national mandates that clearly create such obstacles, or benefits, for litigants.
This suggests that a conflict that ought to cause a court to avoid an
extraterritorial application of its laws may have to involve a conduct directive
from the foreign nation, which ought not be the case.
Whether only such a directive creates Mr. Justice Souter's "true conflict"
remains to be decided. What may occur is increasing judicial deference to
administrative "suggestions" as to whether the court ought to proceed,
reminiscent of the unpleasant experiences between the courts and the
Department of State before the adoption of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA) in 197605 But those experiences led to the adoption of the
FSIA, which was drafted with quite reasonable clarity in outlining when a
U.S. court would assume jurisdiction over a foreign state."°
Any new participation by the executive branch, however, is likely to lead
to laws with greater expressions of clarity regarding the extraterritorial scope
of the law. While the FSIA adopted immunity theory that is generally
recognized throughout the world, many U.S. laws that induce conflicts when
applied extraterritorially are neither clear as to their application abroad, nor
acceptable in theory to other nations. Rejection by foreign states may be due
to the substance of the law, as in the case of the Cuban Democracy Act of
199207 and Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996,308 or

304. Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 765 (citation omitted).
305. See MICHAEL WALLACE GORDON, FOREIGN STATE IMMUNITY IN COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS, ch. 4 (1991) (describing this experience).
306. The antitrust and securities laws claim no such clarity.
307. 22 U.S.C. § 6001 (1994).
308. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6021 (1996).
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to remedies, such as treble damages under antitrust and securities laws.
Rejection also may be more broadly based and apply to elements of the legal
system, as illustrated by the English court in the Butte Mining litigation. 309
The broad range of conflicts which may satisfy Justice Souter's "true
conflict" is yet unknown. Future decisions will clarify whether the Court
will develop traditional international comity theory to deal with these
conflicts, accept the factors of section 403 of the Restatement's, or reject
both and apply U.S. laws extraterritorially as the legislature dictates. The
first choice would receive nearly unanimous approval abroad, and I suspect
very substantial approval in the United States. The second choice would
receive little approval abroad and a nominal amount in the United States.
The third choice would receive overwhelming condemnation both from
abroad and from most jurists in the United States.
B.

EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco)

When the Supreme Court decided Aramco in 1991,310 the obvious
question it raised with regard to extraterritoriality in general was what scope
the case would have. First, it might become very limited in scope and be
interpreted to apply only to the extraterritoriality of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Second, it might constitute a rule of general application
but only be applied where there were no established lines of cases that had
found extraterritorial intent even in the absence of any language justifying
extension such as in the areas of antitrust and securities fraud. Third, it
could be applied to all federal laws, thus reversing the sequence of decisions
in both the antitrust and securities fraud areas.
The court in Aramco said, "We assume that Congress legislates against
'
the backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality."3 11
Congress
clearly has the authority to enact laws with extraterritorial effect, but in so
doing, it may create a conflict with other sovereign nations' interests;
therefore, the presumption is sound. Thus, it becomes essential to determine
the intent of Congress. In the absence of any statutory language that clearly
expresses extraterritorial effect, the law must be assumed to be limited to
domestic acts.3 12 The Court seemed to distinguish reliance upon the
language of the statute from reliance upon legislative history or statutory

309. Simon Eng'g, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 104. Such a conflict surely would not cause a U.S.
court to defer going forward for either international comity reasons or Restatement interest
balancing factors.
310. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 244.
311. Id.at 248.
312. "[U]nless there is'the affirmative intention of Congress clearly expressed,'" the
presumption isthat the law does not have extraterritorial effect. Id.(quoting Benz v.
Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1949)).
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purpose and noted the former as controlling." 3
Lower federal courts deciding cases in the future involving federal laws
other than Title VII might interpret the Aramco decision so as to have little
effect on the line of antitrust and securities fraud cases by either finding
legislative intent essentially synonymous where there is "legislative control,"
and thus in effect address the presumption language of Aramco, or simply
limiting Aramco to Title VII cases and rejecting (or more likely ignoring)
314
Aramco's language as statements of general application.
This does not seem to be what has been happening since Aramco was
decided. Federal courts confronting the extraterritoriality of such statutes as
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 31 5 the National Environmental Policy
Act, 316 the Copyright Act,317 the Bank Holding Company Act, 31" and
the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act319 have all
viewed Aramco as having established a general rule of interpretation. This
first alternative of Aramco's impact already seems to have been eliminated.
Aramco has become and will continue to be the reference for any new
federal law whenever a question of extraterritorial application is raised. Let
me also suggest that the third alternative has been rejected, that is, the
likelihood that Aramco will be applied to reverse years of development of
extraterritorial application of laws such as the antitrust and securities fraud
provisions. The Hartford Fire Insurance decision, where Justice Souter
writing for the majority made no reference to Aramco, seems to be a clear
rejection of Aramco as having any kind of retroactive application. What will
happen when the Supreme Court ultimately accepts certiorari to determine the
contours of extraterritorial application of the securities fraud laws? Perhaps
the court will ignore Aramco and refer only to Hartford Fire Insurance. I
think that Professor Kramer was absolutely correct in questioning the absence
of any reference to Aramco in Justice Souter's opinion in Hartford Fire
Insurance.320 I suspect that Justice Souter's opinion is not "sloppy opinionwriting,

3 21

as Professor Kramer has labeled, but a measured decision not

313. "In applying this rule of construction, we look to see whether 'language in the
[relevant Act] gives any indication of a congressional purpose to extend its coverage beyond
places over which the United States has sovereignty or has some measure of legislative
control.'" Id. (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 218, 285 (1949)) (alteration in

original).
314. The latter is apparently how Justice Souter preferred to treat Aramco in Hartford Fire
Insurance, where he did not even make reference to the earlier Aramco decision.
315. Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping, Inc., 932 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1991).
316. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
317. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994).
318. Gushi Bros. v. Bank of Guam, 28 F.3d 1535 (9th Cir. 1994).
319. Kollias v. D & G Marine Maintenance, 29 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1994).
320. Kramer, supra note 83, at 753.
321. Id. at 754.
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to engage in a dialogue regarding the fringes of subject matter jurisdiction to
get quickly to his main point: The congressional intent regarding antitrust
law has been satisfactorily, if not correctly, established in previous cases and
includes extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws. If Aramco had been
decided before Alcoa and before Schoenbaum, those decisions might have
been quite different. But Alcoa and Schoenbaum, which include the full line
of circuit court cases described above, have "settled in" as applicable law,
and to disrupt them with a finding in Aramco that rejects their extraterritorial
application would create a disharmony in the methodology of the system
itself.
C. Butte Mining Litigation
The Butte Mining litigation, like the earlier Laker Airways litigation, is
troubling. Antisuit (and anti-antisuit) injunctions, like blocking and clawback
laws, do not produce the kind of harmonious judicial resonance that nations
must seek to achieve. Legislatures are increasingly imposing upon the
judiciary enactments that combine clarity and the creation of international
discord. It was not the legislature in England, but the High Court that was
the source of the reasons for the. antisuit injunction ruling in the Butte
Mining litigation in Simon Engineering. It must be to the judiciary that we
turn for the resolution, not the creation, of these conflicts.3" It is the
judiciary that has added to the conflicts created by legislatures with the
enactment of blocking laws, by the creation of the anti- and anti-antisuit
injunctions. Fortunately, they have been applied in a rather narrow range of
cases, as illustrated by the Butte Mining and Laker Airways litigations. In
each of those episodes, the plaintiff in the United States was foreign (British),
and one or more primary defendants also were foreign (British). This is not
a frequent occurrence, but it happens in the United States more often than
abroad because foreign plaintiffs seek out the U.S. courts to gain larger
awards. The Butte Mining experience, as the Laker Airways experience
before it, has limited effect. The influence of this litigation may be seen in
the decisions it affects, such as the influence of the U.S. Ninth Circuit Butte
Mining decision on the development of extraterritorial subject matter
jurisdiction and possibly on interest balancing, in that federal circuit.
Was the conflict in Butte Mining, created by the use of antisuit
injunctions because of the English view of the U.S. legal system, a true
conflict under Har(fordFireInsurance? The answer has to be a resounding
no. Use of the U.S. legal system by the English plaintiff was compelled

322. That task may confront U.S. courts faced with cases under the "trafficking" provisions
of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, if the U.S. President does not continue
to extend the effective date for the initiation of such cases.
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neither by the United States nor England. Although the English Simon
Engineeringdecision almost seems to suggest that no English national should
be subjected to a civil suit in the United States, whether or not the plaintiff
also happens to be English, bringing suit in either the United States or
England would not interfere with the other nation's rules. The English court
could only step in and grant the antisuit injunction because the plaintiff and
primary defendants were English.323 The use of an antisuit injunction
attempts to deprive a foreign court of subject matter jurisdiction. The
application for and possibility of receiving an antisuit injunction surely
creates a "true conflict," although the reason for its being granted, if it
includes the denigration of a legal system, as in Simon Engineering,departs
from the logical meaning of a true conflict and creates a more serious
conflict. When the conflict is no longer one of legislative creation, but
extends to the judiciary, it is time for diplomatic resolutions. It is difficult
to envision the kind of conflict that exists in the Butte Mining litigation,
which threatens to engulf the type of conflict expressed in Hartford Fire
Insurance, as being resolved without formal negotiations between the nations.
The allegations of "illegitimate advantage" of a plaintiff in the United States
and the "oppressive," and even possibly "vexatious," nature of civil litigation
therein, expressed in Simon Engineering,have no foundations in international
law. The Butte Mining litigation has carried the conflict beyond the capacity
of the courts to resolve. No matter how certainly an English defendant
charged with securities fraud may have engaged in conduct and caused
effects in the United States, an English court might conclude that subject
matter jurisdiction should not be exercised because the U.S. legal system is
oppressive. If it is truly oppressive, no one should be subject to its rulings.
But would any U.S. court conclude in such a case that it ought not go
forward? Perhaps the Ninth Circuit did in Butte Mining. Simon Engineering
and to some extent the earlier Laker Airways seem to have preempted the
courts from ruling on subject matter jurisdiction where antisuit injunctions are
granted in the defendant's home court.
How is it all to come out? The U.S. legislature is increasingly making
it clear that certain laws are to have an extensive extraterritorial application,
while other nations react with increasingly clear blocking and clawback laws.

323. That may not be the case. Under Simon Engineering the concern of the English court
was the oppressiveness of the U.S. system to the defendant. The presence of the English
plaintiff provided a way of terminating the action, at least in the minds of the English court.

Why couldn't there be a similar ruling when the plaintiff is from a third nation, even from the
United States? The antisuit injunction would essentially be saying that the English courts
clearly would not recognize any decision ultimately rendered by the U.S. court, assuming the
latter court continued with the suit. Third nation courts also might refuse enforcement, if they
shared either the distaste for the extraterritorial extension of the U.S. law, or the "oppressiveness" of the U.S. legal system.
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This seems to leave the legislatures out as a solution. The courts have not
performed very well with interest balancing or with international comity. It
may well be that were the advocates of interest balancing to rephrase much
of their language in the framework of developing international comity rules,
it would be better accepted abroad. Part of the problem is that as "interest
balancing," it is too "American."
Foreign courts have not accepted
interesting balancing, unless one were to fully disparage that theory by
suggesting that Simon Engineering engaged in true interest balancing. The
executive departments are unlikely to fare any better in entering the field than
the U.S. Department of State did prior to the FSIA enactment. International
arbitration of the proper forum in numerous cases seems awkward and
certainly time consuming. Some creative dispute resolution is certainly
needed. It will not be achieved when nations' legislatures act nationalistically in enacting laws, or when nations' courts act nationalistically when
deciding proper forums, or when nations' academics act nationalistically in
drafting their own versions of international law. Resolution means
cooperation, not co-option.
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